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A government that robs Peter to pay Paul can always depend on the support of 
Paul. 
George Bernard Shaw 
 
About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists of telling would-be clients 
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Everything that irritates us about others can lead us to an understanding of 
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Carl Jung 
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Twenty years ago, California reacted with suspicion to inventor Gilbert Hy-
att’s move to Nevada, concluding that he had not actually changed his residency 
to Las Vegas in time to avoid millions in state taxes based on a lucrative patent 
assignment. So convinced was California, it engaged in highly questionable 
shadowing of Hyatt (including dumpster dives). A jury later found this shadowing 
sufficiently abhorrent to support a multi-million dollar damage verdict in Hyatt’s 
favor as part of Hyatt’s invasion of privacy/abuse of power claim. Ultimately, af-
ter two trips to the U.S. Supreme Court, the verdict was substantially reduced and 
then limited by Nevada’s own cap on damages levied against the government. 
Despite the long-running tort litigation and California administrative proceed-
ings regarding Hyatt’s final tax bill, it appears that his net award will be quite 
modest. This is largely because of a Nevada damages cap of $50,000 in actions 
against the government (since increased to $100,000), no matter how outrageous 
the conduct or extensive the injuries inflicted. 
Most constitutionally important about the Hyatt decision is not only the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause decision (finding that claims by a resident against a for-
eign state entity were limited by the forum state’s own ceiling on damages against 
forum state entities) but also that Hyatt nearly resulted in the demise of Nevada v. 
Hall, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1979 decision permitting suits against a state by 
residents of another state. Hall survived Hyatt—for the moment—but the Hall 
precedent remains vulnerable, perhaps surviving only because of Justice Scalia’s 
untimely death. Unfortunately, Congress’s confirmation of Scalia successor Neil 
Gorsuch did not examine the nominee’s position on the important state sover-
eignty and individual rights issues presented in Hyatt and Hall. This makes it 
hard to know if Hall will survive its next examination. States should reconsider 
whether they have engaged in unduly harmful interstate competition and erected 
undue barriers to recovery against themselves or states inflicting harm on their 
citizens. The Hall and the Hyatt litigation should also prompt government agen-
cies to consider the apt limits of their investigative zeal and should similarly 
prompt victims of excessive state investigatory zeal to think carefully about the 
proportionality of response. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “the King can do no wrong”1 is well-known to both laypersons 
and lawyers. Although the phrase grates on modern ears, it remains a staple of 
the law reflected through a continuing presumption of sovereign immunity,2 as 
                                                        
1  See J.W. EHRLICH, EHRLICH’S BLACKSTONE 67 (1959) (“The King Can Do No Wrong”); 1 
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 500, 518 (2d ed. 1898); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 235 (1765); accord Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal con-
ception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal 
right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”). The phrase 
stems from the doctrine’s origins to insulate unpopular decisions of royalty from legal con-
sequences and, despite remaining the law in many states or supporting limited liability 
against the government, has been heavily criticized from the mid-Twentieth Century on. See, 
e.g., Krause v. State, 274 N.E.2d 321, 324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971), rev’d, 285 N.E.2d 736 
(Ohio 1972) (“Governmental immunity is an anachronism. It represents a vestige of the an-
cient apotheosis of the state in the person of a king. That the king can do no wrong is a dubi-
ous concept in a nation whose very founding repudiated kings.”); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 1001 (3d ed. 1964) (“the idea that whatever the 
state does must be lawful, which has replaced the king who can do no wrong; [is a] very du-
bious theory. . . ”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1201, 1201 (2001); see also Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 
NEB. L. REV. 1, 4, 26, 113–14 (2002) (concluding after historical analysis that case law em-
bracing sovereign immunity misread statements and intent of Founders). 
2  Sovereign immunity remains the default common law in most states, although it has been 
waived in part in nearly all states, but ordinarily with the state establishing damages caps for 
potential liability. See Sovereign Immunity, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sovereign_immunity [https://perma.cc/VWA9-DSXJ] (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2017) (defining the term as “the idea that the sovereign or government is 
immune from lawsuits or other legal actions except when it consents to them. Historically, 
this was an absolute doctrinal position that held Federal, state, and local governments im-
mune from tort liability arising from the activities of government. These days, the applica-
tion of sovereign immunity is much less clear-cut, as different governments have waived lia-
bility in differing degrees under differing circumstances.”). 
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curtailed or modified in statutes like the Federal Tort Claims Act3 or state ana-
logs.4 Absent specific legislative intervention, sovereign immunity is still the 
prevailing norm.5 The ancient assumption of an unerring sovereign (or at least 
one that should not be bothered to explain its alleged misdeeds in court) has 
been replaced by the modern rationale that government resources should not be 
too easily subject to claims, lest the availability of damages from the govern-
ment result in litigation frenzy burdening taxpayers or unduly chill the opera-
tion of governments by making agents hesitant to act for fear of legal conse-
quences.6 Despite this evolution, sovereign immunity remains substantially in 
place. 
 But even this somewhat defanged concept of sovereign immunity is prob-
lematic both normatively and empirically. Normatively, it is hard to justify 
permitting a government to be absolved of potentially heinous behavior—or 
permitted to pay reduced damages for injuries it inflicts—when other social ac-
tors (individual and corporate) are required to be held accountable for similar 
behavior. Empirically, there is little actual evidence to suggest that government 
operations would be significantly diminished, much less imperiled, if govern-
ments were held accountable for their wrongs in the same manner as most ordi-
nary persons or entities. In addition, sovereign immunity creates collateral pub-
lic policy detriments to the extent that state policies toward immunity diverge. 
 Sovereign immunity combined with constitutional law in Hyatt v. Fran-
chise Tax Board of California.7 Hyatt turned on whether Nevada’s statutory cap 
                                                        
3  See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012) (“[t]he United States [is] liable . . . in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but [is not] liable for inter-
est prior to judgment or for punitive damages.”). The statute, passed in 1948, permits private 
parties to sue the U.S. in federal court if alleging injury by a tort committed by persons act-
ing on behalf of the U.S. Although establishing exclusive federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
the law instructs courts to apply applicable state substantive tort law. 
4  See State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-sovereign-immunity-and-tort-liab 
ility.aspx [https://perma.cc/26PZ-NNE4] (last visited Oct. 17, 2017) (“state tort claims acts 
modeled after the FTCA are the most prevalent statutory waiver allowing tort claims against 
the state” with “[a]t least 33 states” limiting the amount that may be recovered and “at least 
29 states” barring an award against the state of punitive damages). See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 815 (2002) (effective Jan. 1, 2003) (regarding liability of public entities); Id. § 822.2 
(regarding liability of public employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4-141 (2016) (effective June 
9, 2016) (concerning “Claims Against the State”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.0305 (2005) (“Lia-
bility of and Actions Against This State, Its Agencies and Political Subdivisions”). 
5  See Public Entity Claims Handling Resource Guide, MUNICH REINSURANCE AM. 23 (2d. 
ed. 2014) (50-state survey reflects prevalence of sovereign immunity as the norm subject to 
legislation such as state tort claims acts permitting limited recovery in the manner of NRS 
41.035); Gary L. Wickert, Suing the King: State Sovereign Immunity and Tort Liability in All 
50 States, MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHER, S.C. (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.mwl-
law.com/suing-the-king-state-sovereign-immunity-and-tort-liability-in-all-50-states/ [https:// 
perma.cc/R99V-A2DM]. 
6  See infra notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
7  Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt IV), 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016). Apologizing in ad-
vance for being cumbersome in order to try to be clear about this long-running dispute, I will 
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on damages against the state limited Plaintiff Hyatt’s claim against California, 
which, by virtue of an earlier decision in the case, was held not to be protected 
by its own immunity law.8 The Hyatt case also ran the risk of the U.S. Supreme 
Court overruling Hall v. Nevada, which permits suits against State A in the 
courts of State B.9 Hall’s demise, which would have allowed states to inflict 
wrongs on the citizens of other states without legal consequences, was avoid-
ed—perhaps only because of the February 2016 death of Justice Scalia, leaving 
the Court divided 4-4 on the issue. Hall dodged a bullet in Hyatt—but just 
barely. In replacing Justice Scalia on the Court, President Trump pledged to 
nominate a Scalia-like conservative in former Tenth Circuit Judge Neil Gor-
such.10 But will that conservatism extend to the view that one state cannot sue 
another over alleged wrongdoing within its borders? 
 One might also explore the apparent contradiction reflected by conserva-
tive jurists who, on one hand, express concern about government size, power, 
and abuse; but on the other hand, are unwilling to require executive agencies of 
                                                                                                                                 
refer to the Nevada Supreme Court’s initial 2002 decision in Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, No. 35549, 2002 Nev. LEXIS 57 (Nev. Apr. 4, 2002) as Hyatt I 
and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 
488 (2003) as Hyatt II. The Nevada Supreme Court’s second decision in 2014 (Franchise 
Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 335 P.3d 125 (Nev. 2014)) is Hyatt III. See generally Article IV—
Full Faith and Credit—Sovereign Immunity—Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 130 HARV. L. 
REV. 317 (2016) (providing background and summary of the four Hyatt decisions); Julie M. 
Bradlow, FTB v. Hyatt: Taxes, Torts and the Constitution, LAW360 (Apr. 27, 2016, 11:21 
AM), https//www.law360.com/articles/787039/ftb-v-hyatt-taxes-torts-and-the-constitution 
[https://perma.cc/FB6E-FQPL]. 
8  See Hyatt II, 538 U.S. at 492–94; Hyatt I, 2002 Nev. LEXIS 57, at *7. 
9  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1979). 
10  See Sandy Fitzgerald, Trump: My Supreme Court Pick ‘Closest to Scalia I Can Find,’ 
NEWSMAX (MAR. 16, 2016, 9:41 AM), http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/trump-
SCOTUS-pick-close/2016/03/16/id/719332/ [https://perma.cc/MB3L-35CG] (in Fox News 
interview, candidate Trump states that he would appoint to the Court “someone as close to 
[Antonin] Scalia as I could find” and that Scalia would serve “as the model. As close to Scal-
ia. I thought Scalia was terrific.”). President Trump followed through on this campaign 
promise in nominating Justice Gorsuch as Justice Scalia’s replacement. See Richard L. 
Hasen, Gorsuch Is the New Scalia, Just as Trump Promised, L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2017, 3:00 
AM), http://beta.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe=hasen-gorsuch-scalia-20170627-story.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/U79K-JL2V] (Prominent law Professor Hasen notes that since joining 
the Court in April 2017, Justice Gorsuch has shown himself to be very conservative on many 
issues, as was Justice Scalia. Particularly noted was that Justice Gorsuch had encouraged 
review of the “soft money ban” in the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, supported 
greater aid to parochial schools, encouraged review of a California gun control law, opposed 
the right of same sex parents to have both names on birth certificates and gave greater sup-
port to the Trump Administration’s travel ban than other Justices. Professor Hasen also noted 
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Henson v. Santander Consumer U.S.A., 137 S. Ct. 
1718, 1721–23 (2017) (entities purchasing debts and then trying to collect on them were not 
“debt collectors” within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. 1692(a) because the purchasers were not 
persons to whom the debt was “owed” which was the term used in the text of the statute), 
which endorsed the textualist approach to statutory interpretation favored by Justice Scalia 
but arguably reached a problematic result in that entities actually collecting debts were 
deemed not to be “debt collectors” under the statute). 
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governments to be held accountable by courts in other states where a foreign 
government has caused injury within the forum state. More globally, and as re-
flected in Hyatt, the very concept of immunity and limited liability for govern-
ments begs for reassessment in light of the outdatedness of the concept and the 
lack of uniformity of states regarding limitations on their liability. States, even 
if retaining damage caps, may wish to adjust the amounts so as not to unduly 
limit the rights of their own citizens seeking recompense for injury inflicted by 
other states. 
I. THE HYATT SAGA 
A. The Case of the Moving Inventor 
 The controversy regarding state court power to exercise judicial power 
over another state stems from inventor Gilbert Hyatt’s successful computer pa-
tent for which he received millions of dollars in royalty payments. Hyatt, who 
lived in California most of his adult life and while inventing, maintained that he 
relocated to Nevada in November 1991 prior to receipt of the royalty payments. 
The California Tax Board took the position that Hyatt was not a Nevada resi-
dent until April 1992, by which time he had received sufficient royalty pay-
ments to owe $4.5 million in California state income taxes for the 1991 tax 
year, and $6 million in taxes for 1992—for a total of $10 million.11 According 
to California, this figure had grown to more than $50 million with penalties and 
interest. Hyatt challenged the Board’s decision through the California adminis-
trative process and courts.  
 Apart from the tax issues, Hyatt commenced separate tort litigation in Ne-
vada state court in 1998, alleging that the California Tax Board was harassing 
him in a manner constituting fraud, invasion of privacy, and intentional inflic-
                                                        
11  See Hyatt III, 335 P.3d at 132. As this article was being finalized, the Hyatt saga took two 
significant steps toward completion, which are discussed at greater length at the conclusion 
of the article. By a split 3-2 vote, the Franchise Tax Board on August 29, 2017, substantially 
sided with Hyatt, dramatically reducing his tax liability, but further judicial proceedings re-
main possible. See Adam Ashton, After 24 Years, Wealthy Inventor Gets His Day in Tax 
Court—and Wins, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 30, 2017, 7:08 AM), 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article170165567.html 
[https://perma.cc/H23J-C3FP]. On September 14, 2017, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled on 
matters remanded from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision that is the focal point of this 
article. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt V), 401 P.3d 1110 (Nev.  2017) (for 
reasons that will become apparent after discussion of the other four major Hyatt reported 
opinions). The Court ruled that complete sovereign immunity did not apply to intentional 
torts or bad faith conduct by a state entity but that state entities were immune from punitive 
damages, with compensatory damages subject to the state’s applicable damages cap 
($50,000 at the time of California’s injuries to Hyatt; $100,000 today). Id. at 1117. However, 
in a ruling that may be significant in the protracted Hyatt litigation, the Court held that pre-
judgment interest, costs, and counsel fees are not subject to the cap. Id. at 1140-41. 
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tion of emotional distress.12 The Nevada Court did not allow the Board to re-
move the case to federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment.13 Confined 
to state court, the Board unsuccessfully argued before a Nevada trial court and 
the Nevada Supreme Court that the Board should receive the benefit of Califor-
nia’s statutory immunity in Nevada just as it would in California.14 
B. Rejection of California’s Initial Full Faith and Credit Immunity Defense 
 In California Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, (“Hyatt II”), the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the Nevada Supreme Court’s refusal to apply California’s statute 
immunizing the tax collection authority from suit.15 The Hyatt II Court unani-
mously found no violation of Article IV § 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which re-
quires that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State” where the forum state 
court (Nevada) found that such an application would violate the forum state’s 
own legitimate public policy of providing its citizens a right to seek recom-
pense for the allegedly tortious acts of a foreign state.16 
C. A Huge Award Dramatically Reduced by the Nevada Supreme Court—But 
Full or Reciprocal Immunity Denied to California 
 The case proceeded to trial, with a 2008 jury verdict in favor of Hyatt, 
awarding damages of $85 million for emotional distress, $52 million for inva-
sion of privacy, $1.1 million for fraud, and $250 million in punitive damages.17 
Hyatt was also awarded $2.5 million in costs, bringing the total trial court 
judgment to roughly $390 million.18 The Tax Board appealed to the Nevada 
Supreme Court—with some success. 
 The Nevada Supreme Court in Hyatt III upheld the $1.1 million fraud 
award, but overturned the invasion of privacy claims as a matter of law and re-
manded the emotional distress claim due to evidentiary and jury instruction er-
                                                        
12  See Hyatt III, 335 P.3d at 132; Hyatt V, 2017 WL 4079069, at *1–2. In Hyatt V, the Court 
also issued an important ruling regarding damages for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, adopting a “sliding scale” approach in which medical documentation as not strictly 
necessary provided that there was sufficient other evidence of injury, with the amount of ev-
idence necessary to successfully support such a claim subject to variation depending on the 
severity of the misconduct toward the claimant. Gilbert Hyatt refused to release his medical 
records but there was in the Court’s view sufficient testimony supporting his claim that he 
incurred emotional distress. See id. at *18–20. 
13  See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
14  See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Hyatt I), No. 35549, 2002 
Nev. LEXIS 57, at *5 (Nev. Apr. 4, 2002). 
15  See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt II), 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003). 
16  See id. at 494–98. 
17  See Hyatt III, 335 P.3d at 134. 
18  See id. 
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rors in the court below.19 The Court—as a matter of comity rather than constitu-
tional requirement—also struck down the punitive damages award.20 Because 
of these changes, the cost award was also subject to remand.21 The Court also 
rejected Hyatt’s cross-appeal, holding that the trial court incorrectly prevented 
Hyatt from seeking economic damages as part of his emotional distress claim.22 
Although the judgment had been drastically reduced, California still faced lia-
bility of between $1 million and $85 million, prompting the State’s successful 
cert petition,23 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision largely favoring Califor-
nia as to the outcome (a dramatic reduction in Hyatt’s award and a requirement 
of comity as to sovereign immunity damage caps), but leaving Nevada v. Hall 
in place.24 
 The Nevada Supreme Court took the view that it was not required by the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause or principles of comity to give the Tax Board the 
benefit of Nevada’s statutory cap on its own governmental liability because do-
ing so would conflict with Nevada’s “[state] policy interest in providing ade-
quate redress to Nevada citizens.”25 The Tax Board argued that even if it could 
be held liable by courts of another state, its liability should be capped at 
$50,000, the maximum amount courts could impose upon a Nevada govern-
ment agency at the time.26 The Board also argued for the overruling of Nevada 
v. Hall, which permits a sovereign State to be sued in another State without the 
defendant foreign state’s consent.27 
 Pursuant to the Nevada Supreme Court’s Decision in Hyatt III, the $390 
million judgment was realistically reduced by more than three-fourths because, 
in light of the Nevada Supreme Court’s directions for retrial, a second trial on 
the emotional distress claim would be unlikely to result in a verdict exceeding 
the initial verdict of $85 million.28 But because a potential judgment between 
$1 million and $85 million is still a lot of money, even for the largest state in 
the union, California continued to fight. Regarding liability, Hyatt IV was a 
clear victory for the Tax Board because it effectively allowed Hyatt to recover 
only tens of thousands of dollars rather than the tens of millions he might have 
gained pursuant to Hyatt III. More important from a doctrinal and constitutional 
perspective were the issues of whether Nevada v. Hall should remain good law 
                                                        
19  See id. at 139–53, 157. 
20  See id. at 153–54. 
21  Id. at 154. 
22  See id. at 155–57. 
23  See Hyatt IV, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1283 (2016). 
24  See id. at 1279. 
25  See Hyatt III, 335 P.3d at 153. 
26  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (valid through Sept. 30, 2007) (statutory maximum of 
$50,000 prior to 2007; $100,000 currently). 
27  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979). 
28  See Hyatt III, 335 P.3d at 153. 
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and whether, even under a Hall regime, the courts of forum states could subject 
a sister state to liability that would never be permitted against the forum state. 
 California’s argument that its liability should be capped at $50,000—the 
maximum amount that could be imposed upon a Nevada government agency at 
the time in question29—has a logical fairness to it that ultimately prevailed be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court. Nonetheless, the Nevada Supreme Court took the 
view that this sort of Golden Rule-style fairness was not required by the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause or principles of comity and that Nevada need not give 
the Tax Board the benefit of Nevada’s own statutory cap because this would 
conflict with Nevada’s “[state] policy interest in providing adequate redress to 
Nevada citizens.”30 The U.S. Supreme Court’s review addressed the following 
questions: 
1. Whether Nevada may refuse to extend to sister States haled into Neva-
da courts the same immunities Nevada enjoys in those courts. 
2. Whether Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), which permits a sover-
eign State to be haled into the courts of another State without its con-
sent, should be overruled.31 
 The first question addressed the real Achilles’ heel of the Nevada Supreme 
Court’s 2014 Hyatt III decision—its refusal to give California’s Tax Board the 
same benefits of the cap on liability that Nevada’s own state agencies enjoy. 
The Nevada damages cap may be unwise public policy,32 but the cap is none-
theless the law.33 If Nevada taxing authorities hound a taxpayer in the manner 
alleged in Hyatt v. Tax Board, their liability is capped. Notwithstanding the fo-
rum state’s strong interest in protecting its citizens, it is difficult to see how ap-
plying this cap to a similarly situated foreign state entity defendant can be re-
pugnant to the public policy of the forum state when that same forum state 
grants its own agencies so much protection from liability. 
 This disparate treatment foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hyatt IV 
decision. It clearly bothered Justice Breyer at oral argument.34 It also is in ten-
                                                        
29  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (valid through Sept. 30, 2007) (statutory maximum of 
$50,000 prior to 2007; $100,000 currently). 
30  See Hyatt III, 335 P.3d at 153. 
31  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt IV), 136 S. 
Ct. 1277 (2016) (No. 14-1175); Docket No. 14-1175, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES (June 30, 2015), https://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket 
files/14-1175.htm [https://perma.cc/5XET-NER9] (last visited Sept. 30, 2017) (“Petition 
GRANTED limited to Questions 2 and 3 presented by the petition.”). 
32  The damages cap applies, for example, to malpractice claims against the University Medi-
cal Center, which, like most medical service providers can err in ways that inflict serious 
injury or death upon patients. UMC’s reputation in the community is sufficiently checkered 
and the damages cap sufficiently known and unpopular that there is a longstanding local 
“joke” that cautious Las Vegas drivers should wear a name tag instructing ambulance drivers 
to avoid UMC in responding to an accident scene. 
33  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1). 
34  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt IV), 136 
S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (No. 14-1175) (Justice Breyer: “[I]t seems to me intuitively at some level 
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sion with Hyatt II, where the Court, per Justice O’Connor, found the matter not 
a case of a “ ‘policy of hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State” because the 
“Nevada Supreme Court [in its 2002 decision] sensitively applied principles of 
comity with a healthy regard for California’s sovereign status, relying on the 
contours of Nevada’s own sovereign immunity from suit as a benchmark for its 
analysis.”35 
D. The U.S. Supreme Court Demands Symmetry 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Nevada Supreme Court’s arguable 2014 depar-
ture from this consistency (by a factor of more than twenty in light of the size 
of Hyatt’s fraud award alone) resulted in the 2016 Hyatt IV decision requiring 
that, in order to comply with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, forum state 
courts must give foreign state entity defendants the same treatment their own 
agencies would receive in the forum state’s courts.36 In Nevada v. Hall, Cali-
fornia was not only willing to impose million-dollar liability upon Nevada, but 
upon itself as well, at least for auto accidents.37 
 Nevada’s double standard did not survive. In Hyatt IV, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that Nevada’s refusal to limit California’s liability as it would the 
forum state’s own liability reflected a “policy of hostility” to the statutes of an-
other sovereign.38 
The Nevada Supreme Court has ignored both Nevada’s typical rules of immuni-
ty and California’s immunity-related statutes (insofar as California’s statutes 
would prohibit a monetary recovery that is greater in amount than the maximum 
recovery that Nevada law would permit in similar circumstances). Instead, it has 
applied a special rule of law that evinces a “policy of hostility” toward Califor-
nia. Doing so violates the Constitution’s requirement that “Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings 
of every other State.”39 
The Court further noted that prior to the 2014 Hyatt III decision, 
Nevada’s courts recognized that California’s law of complete immunity would 
prevent any recovery in this case. The Nevada Supreme Court consequently did 
not apply California law. It applied Nevada law instead [permitting suit against a 
state entity]. We upheld that decision as consistent with the Full Faith and Cred-
it Clause. But in doing so, we emphasized both that (1) the Clause does not re-
quire one State to apply another State’s law that violates its “own legitimate 
public policy,” and (2) Nevada’s choice of law did not “exhibi[t] a ‘policy of 
hostility to the public Acts’ of a sister State.” 
* * * 
                                                                                                                                 
correct that a State like Nevada should not be able to give less sovereign immunity to Cali-
fornia than it gives its own officials.”). 
35  Hyatt II, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003). 
36  See Hyatt IV, 136 S. Ct. at 1281–82. 
37  Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426–27 (1979). 
38  See Hyatt IV, 136 S. Ct. at 1282–83. 
39  See id. at 1281 (citation omitted). 
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The Nevada decision before us embodies a critical departure from its earlier ap-
proach. Nevada has not applied the principles of Nevada law ordinarily applica-
ble to suits against Nevada’s own agencies. Rather, it has applied a special rule 
of law applicable only in lawsuits against its sister States, such as California. . . . 
The Nevada Supreme Court explained its departure from those general princi-
ples by describing California’s system of controlling its own agencies as failing 
to provide “adequate” recourse to Nevada’s citizens. It expressed concerns about 
the fact that California’s agencies “operat[e] outside” the systems of “legislative 
control, administrative oversight, and public accountability” that Nevada applies 
to its own agencies. Such an explanation, which amounts to little more than a 
conclusory statement disparaging California’s own legislative, judicial, and ad-
ministrative controls, cannot justify the application of a special and discrimina-
tory rule. Rather, viewed through a full faith and credit lens, a State that disre-
gards its own ordinary legal principles on this ground is hostile to another State. 
A constitutional rule that would permit this kind of discriminatory hostility is 
likely to cause chaotic interference by some States into the internal, legislative 
affairs of others. . . . In our view, Nevada’s rule lacks the “healthy regard for 
California’s sovereign status” that was the hallmark of its earlier decision. . . .40 
 Justice Alito concurred without opinion.41 Justice Roberts, joined by Jus-
tice Thomas, dissented. Noting that the differential treatment (of Nevada courts 
capping damages against the forum state at $50,000 but permitting seven-figure 
judgments against a neighboring state) was seemingly unfair, the dissent none-
theless took the position that 
for better or worse, the word “fair” does not appear in the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. The Court’s decision is contrary to our precedent holding that the Clause 
does not block a State from applying its own law to redress an injury within its 
own borders. The opinion also departs from the text of the Clause which—when 
it applies—requires a State to give full faith and credit to another State’s laws. 
The Court instead permits partial credit: To comply with the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause [if it were applicable], the Nevada Supreme Court need only af-
ford the Board the same limited immunity that Nevada agencies enjoy.42 
 The dissent acknowledged that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is more 
difficult to apply to state laws as opposed to its “straightforward” application to 
state judgments, which “must be respected in another [State] provided that the 
first State had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.”43 Citing 
Caroll v. Lanza,44 Justice Roberts took the view that 
                                                        
40  See id. at 1281–83 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
41  See id. at 1283 (Alito, J., concurring). 
42  Id. at 1284 (emphasis added). 
43  Id. at 1285. 
44  Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, (1955). Carroll v. Lanza involved a Missouri worker em-
ployed by a Missouri subcontractor injured in Arkansas who brought a negligence action in 
Arkansas against the general contractor. The Carroll v. Lanza Court rejected a Full Faith and 
Credit Clause defense to the application of Arkansas workers’ compensation law, which al-
lowed sued against general contractors, something not permitted under Missouri’s workers’ 
compensation law. See id. at 413 (“Arkansas, the State of the forum, is not adopting any pol-
icy of hostility to the public Acts of Missouri. It is choosing to apply its own rule of law to 
give affirmative relief for an action arising within its borders.”). 
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[w]here a State chooses a different rule from a sister State in order “to give af-
firmative relief for an action arising within its borders,” the State has a sufficient 
policy reason for applying its own law, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause is 
satisfied.45 
 Focusing on California’s misconduct, Justice Roberts noted that “Hyatt al-
leges that the Board committed multiple torts, including fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress [and that] there is no doubt that Nevada has a 
‘sufficient’ policy interest in protecting Nevada residents from such injuries.”46 
 The dissenters found it sufficient that a state outside of the forum state, as a 
matter of course, is not subject to controls on its behavior by the forum state’s 
legislative and executive branches, thus justifying the availability of the forum 
state judiciary to state residents seeking recompense from a sister State. “The 
majority may think that Nevada is being unfair, but it cannot be said that the 
State failed to articulate a sufficient policy explanation for its decision to apply 
a damages cap to Nevada state agencies, but not to the agencies of other 
States.”47 Further, the dissent noted that far from ignoring California’s sover-
eignty, 
the Nevada court adhered to its policy of sensitivity to comity concerns this time 
around as well [as in Hyatt I]. In deference to the Board’s sovereignty, the court 
threw out a $250 million punitive damages award, on top of its previous deci-
sion that the Board was not liable at all for its negligent acts. That is more than a 
“healthy regard” for California’s sovereign status.48 
 The dissent also criticized the majority for creating a “new hybrid rule” of 
partial sovereign immunity that is “nowhere to be found” in the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause: 
The Court does not require the Nevada Supreme Court to apply either Nevada 
law (no immunity for the Board) or California law (complete immunity for the 
Board). . . . [But if] the majority is correct that Nevada has no sufficient policy 
justification for applying Nevada immunity law, then California law applies. 
And under California law, the Board is entitled to full immunity. Or, if Nevada 
has a sufficient policy reason to apply its own law, then Nevada law applies, and 
the Board is subject to full liability.49 
 The well-written Roberts dissent is almost enough to rehabilitate the Neva-
da Supreme Court’s disparate treatment of states—almost. There is a certain 
logic to treating a foreign state as either immune or fully liable rather than sub-
ject to hybridized liability using forum state liability as a measuring stick. But it 
remains unsettling to think that one state can refuse to give another the same 
benefits of a cap on liability that the forum state’s own state agencies enjoy. 
The Nevada damages cap may be unwise public policy, but the cap is nonethe-
                                                        
45  Hyatt IV, 136 S. Ct. at 1286 (emphasis added). 
46  Id. at 1287. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. at 1288. 
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less the law. And even if the word “fair” does not appear in the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, the purpose of the Clause and the intent behind it seems quite 
clearly to be about requiring fairness by the states toward one another as well as 
protecting their sovereignty. 
 Further, the Nevada Supreme Court’s Hyatt III decision would have creat-
ed a situation in which the state’s own citizens—who are more likely to be hurt 
by their government than the government of another state—have only limited 
recourse. But if Nevadans are fortunate enough to suffer the same injury from a 
foreign state government, they would under Hyatt III face no statutory bar to 
full compensation. Constitutional nuances notwithstanding, this is simply a 
self-serving double standard. If Nevada taxing authorities treat a state taxpayer 
in the manner alleged in Hyatt, their liability is capped, at least in its own 
courts, even though not completely immunized as in California. Would Nevada 
really wish to lose these protections when sued outside its borders? 
 There is an appealing consistency to applying the state’s own judgment 
about capping government liability to a similarly situated foreign state even if 
the text of the Clause does not include the word “fair” and even if the forum 
state has a strong interest in protecting its citizens. One might rhetorically ask 
why Nevada, if it is so concerned about its citizens, protects itself with a dam-
ages cap when it is the tortfeasor, but finds such a cap an insufficient protection 
when the Nevadan is injured by the torts of a foreign state. 
 As discussed below, there is no good policy answer to that question.50 Nor 
is the historical rationale for sovereign immunity particularly persuasive. But to 
the extent that sovereign immunity and damages caps are a good idea—or the 
inevitable reality in a world of limited government finances or governments 
feathering their own nests—it seems reasonable or even compelling to require 
some degree of uniformity regarding damage caps and some symmetry for the 
fate of persons injured by the misconduct of different state governments. 
E. The Assault on Nevada v. Hall and its Perhaps Temporary Repulsion 
 Whether to retain the Hall precedent generated closer division of the Hyatt 
IV Court. Ironically (as noted by Justice Ginsburg during oral argument), Ne-
vada v. Hall involved California’s own rejection of Nevada’s immunity. The 
case involved a badly injured California minor and his less injured mother su-
ing Nevada in California state court after a State of Nevada employee driving 
in California negligently hit them. The jury found negligence and awarded 
damages of $1.15 million (more than $7.8 million in 2015 dollars).51 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that Nevada’s own 
limited waiver of sovereign immunity (then $25,000 pursuant to an earlier ver-
sion of the same Nevada Revised Statute (NRS) § 41.035(1) at issue in Hyatt) 
precluded greater recovery by the victims in California’s own courts, which 
                                                        
50  See infra notes 91–106, 117–131 and accompanying text. 
51  See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411–16 (1979). 
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imposed no bar to recovery and no cap on damages for this type of liability.52 
As California Tax Board counsel Paul Clement observed understatedly at the 
Hyatt II oral argument, California had some “buyer’s remorse” about the deci-
sion.53 
 The Hyatt v. Tax Board saga is complex factually, chronologically, and le-
gally. Just as one cannot readily recognize the players without a scorecard, the 
dispute involves difficult areas of law that put several values in tension that 
have never been clearly resolved by the judicial system. To borrow the analogy 
used by Hyatt counsel H. Bartow Farr at oral argument, the issue of state vul-
nerability to litigation is like a three-legged stool. One leg holds that a state 
may declare itself absolutely immune from suit in the state’s own courts. An-
other leg of the stool is provided by the Eleventh Amendment, which provides 
that a state may not be sued in federal court. At issue in Hyatt was the third leg 
of the stool: whether a state can be sued in the courts of another state.54 Beyond 
this—and assuming the continued enforcement of Nevada v. Hall—there is the 
issue of whether a forum state willing to entertain a suit against a sister state 
can give that sister state less protection than the forum state’s own government 
would receive. 
 Regarding the configuration of the third leg of the stool, the California Tax 
Board had more than a few allies. Forty-five states submitted amicus briefs 
supporting California and the overruling of Nevada v. Hall—a perhaps unsur-
prising result in that most prospective defendants prefer more immunity rather 
than less immunity. Consequently, more than 90 percent of the states opposed 
the plaintiff in Hyatt. 
 Hyatt’s counsel, making the best of the adversity, argued that this clearly 
indicates that the states could easily work together to limit their respective lia-
bilities and that there is no need to constitutionalize a nationwide sovereign 
immunity or requirement of reciprocity.55 In response to a question from Justice 
Kennedy, Hyatt’s counsel argued that such inter-state arrangements would not 
require congressional approval because they would not be state compacts in-
creasing the powers of the states vis-à-vis the national government.56 
 Regarding Hall, the Court was “equally divided on this question” and 
“consequently affirm[ed] the Nevada courts’ exercise of jurisdiction over Cali-
                                                        
52  See id. at 426–27. 
53  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 14. 
54  See id. at 34–35. As much as I find the stool analogy educational and a good descriptive 
metaphor, I’m not sure it was particularly persuasive, notwithstanding that it was the meta-
phor chosen by a highly acclaimed Supreme Court advocate. For two of the three legs (suits 
in the defendant government’s home state courts and suits in federal court) there is absolute 
immunity. Consistency would thus suggest that there should be similar or even congruent 
immunity in the courts of another state—unless one is willing to openly question the entire 
regime of sovereign immunity, something which Hyatt counsel did not do. 
55  See id. at 29–30. 
56  See id. 
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fornia.”57 In the wake Justice Scalia’s death,58 observers have speculated as to 
the consequences, noting other instances of 4-4 divisions.59 Hyatt II is no ex-
ception. One observer noted that the opinion as originally released identified 
the majority opinion as the “Opinion of Breyer, J.” rather than the corrected 
version’s “Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.” He read this glitch as 
suggesting that “it was initially either a concurrence or a dissent” (or both), in 
that it would not have been so initially identified had it always been intended to 
be the Court’s opinion.60 
 Although Justice Scalia did not formally urge overturning Nevada v. Hall 
in his prior judicial opinions, he is widely viewed as having concerns about 
Hall,61 perhaps viewing the case as an affront to federalism that would never 
                                                        
57  See Hyatt IV, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1279 (2016). 
58  Justice Scalia died on February 13, 2016, apparently of a heart attack while resting in his 
room while on a hunting trip. See Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme 
Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/anto 
nin-scalia-death.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/793A-PGH3]. 
59  In a moment of prognosticating hubris when writing about Hyatt in December 2015, I 
ventured that Hall would survive on a 6 (Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
Kagan) to 3 (Scalia, Thomas, Alito) vote. I was obviously wrong about Justices Roberts and 
Kennedy. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt: Questions of 
Reciprocal Sovereign Immunity—and the Continued Force of Nevada v. Hall, HAMILTON & 
GRIFFIN ON RIGHTS (Dec. 28, 2015 (Part I) and Dec. 29, 2015 (Part II)), 
http://www.hamilton-griffin.com/2015/12/28/franchise-tax-board-of-california-v-hyatt-quest 
ions-of-reciprocal-sovereign-immunity-and-the-continued-force-of-nevada-v-hall-by-jeffrey-
w-stempel-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/K499-TNCF]. The Hyatt IV Court appears to have split 
evenly along ideological lines (conservatives wanting to overrule Hall; liberals wishing to 
retain it) and political lines (Republican appointees wanting to protect states from suit in the 
courts of another state; Democratic appointees finding a constitutional bar to such suits). 
60  See Nicholas Datlowe, Minor Error, Major Effect, U.S. LAW WEEK BLOG (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.bna.com/minor-error-major-b5798207019 [https://perma.cc/EPB5-3664] 
(“Scalia’s missing vote would have been the deciding one on whether to overrule Nevada v. 
Hall.”). Datlowe reasons, correctly in my view, that if Justices Scalia and Breyer had both 
wanted to overrule Nevada v. Hall, there would have been no need to address the full faith 
and credit aspects of the case. “This means that, had Scalia lived, the Franchise Tax Board 
would have won, 5-4 on the initial question of overruling Nevada v. Hall.” American Uni-
versity law professor Stephen Vladek, who co-authored an amicus brief favoring retention of 
the Hall precedent, takes a similar view. Stempel, supra note 59, at 5. 
61  See Jennifer McLoughlin, Scalia Death Swayed Sovereign Immunity Case: Paul Clement, 
84 U.S. LAW WEEK 1681 (May 12, 2016) (summarizing remarks of Tax Board counsel). 
“It’s in the realm of speculation, I suppose, but I don’t think I’m going too far out on a limb 
to say that I think we probably had Justice Scalia’s vote in the case,” Paul D. Clement said 
May 6 during a panel at an American Bar Association Section of Taxation meeting. Clement, 
the former U.S. solicitor general who represented the California taxing agency in Hyatt, not-
ed that the oral argument transcript suggests Scalia favoring overturning Nevada v. Hall. 
Combined with Scalia’s past opinions regarding sovereign immunity, and an original slip 
opinion that indicated Justice Stephen G. Breyer’s opinion “started as something other than a 
majority opinion,” Clement said that “it seems like at least coming out of conference, there 
were five votes’ to overrule the case.” Id. 
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have been permitted by the Founders or the Republic’s early judges.62 That 
Hall did not arrive until 200 years after the founding bolsters this assessment. 
State governments largely feel the same way, as reflected in the nearly unani-
mous state government support for California against Hyatt and the overruling 
of Nevada v. Hall.63 
F. Hall Hinging on the Next Justice 
 Because the Hall precedent remains in controversy, this presents yet anoth-
er area of law where filling the Scalia vacancy will obviously have an impact 
absent other personnel changes at the Court. Donald Trump’s election as Presi-
dent thwarted President Obama’s 2015 nomination of Merrick Garland. While 
there is no certainty that a Justice Garland would have joined the Court’s four 
moderate-liberals (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan) in supporting Nevada 
v. Hall, President Trump vowed to nominate a Justice akin to Scalia in judicial 
approach, which suggests more danger to Hall than would have been presented 
had Garland been confirmed. But there are no obvious indicators of new Justice 
Neil Gorsuch’s views regarding Nevada v. Hall.64 Conventional wisdom, how-
ever, is that a judicial conservative like Justice Gorsuch is more likely to favor 
originalist construction of the Constitution, and that originalism is more likely 
to favor the dispatch of Hall, a 1979 decision permitting the type of action 
against a state that probably would not have enjoyed the support of the found-
ers.65 
                                                        
62  See Todd Henderson, Argument Preview: The Perversity of Tribal Sovereignty, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 5, 2017, 11:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-
preview-perversity-tribal-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/R6WV-GL53] (discussing pending 
Lewis v. Clarke case presenting the issue of whether Indian tribal sovereignty extends to em-
ployee of Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority in car collision off of Indian lands, also ad-
dressing broader issues of immunity, and concluding that in Hyatt IV, “Justice Antonin Scal-
ia would have been the fifth [vote for overturning Hall] in all likelihood.”); Datlowe, supra 
note 60, at 1 (noting that Justice Breyer’s opinion was likely a dissent initially, which sug-
gests that had Justice Scalia lived he would have cast the deciding fifth vote to overturn Ne-
vada v. Hall). 
63  See, e.g., Brief for West Virginia and 43 Other States as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt IV), 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (No. 14-1175) 
[hereinafter States Amicus Brief]; Brief for The Council of State Governments, et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt IV), 136 S. 
Ct. 1277 (2016) (No. 14-1175) [hereinafter Associations Amicus Brief]. 
64  As of September 6, 2017, none of Justice Gorsuch’s opinions, either as a Tenth Circuit 
judge or a Supreme Court Justice, has cited Nevada v. Hall and there is no evidence that he 
discussed the case in any public statements. 
65  But this conventional wisdom may not be accurate. It was, after all, a Supreme Court pre-
sent at the creation of the Republic that decided Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 
(1793), which permitted suits against sovereign states in the newly created federal courts. To 
be sure, the body politic reacted adversely and swiftly to this decision in enacting the Elev-
enth Amendment, but this does not necessarily mean that a “founder’s Court” of the era 
might not have supported Nevada v. Hall-like suits had one come before the Court’s docket. 
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 Because the Scalia absence probably saved Hall and because judicial liber-
als are generally less smitten with sovereign immunity than their conservative 
peers, one’s first reaction may be to assume a sharp ideological split regarding 
overturning Hall (Roberts-Kennedy-Thomas-Alito in favor and Ginsburg-
Breyer-Sotomayor-Kagan against). But in Hyatt IV, dissenting Justices Roberts 
and Thomas would have affirmed the Nevada Supreme Court’s imposition of 
seven-figure liability against California, which may mean they are not dead-set 
against Hall (as well as taking a different view of Full Faith and Credit than 
their peers) and may be willing to let Hall stand in the absence of a new Justice 
strongly opposed to Hall. 
 But is seems undeniable that Nevada v. Hall is at risk in even the most op-
timistic (for Hall fans) circumstances. A Trump nominee might agree with Jus-
tice Stevens’s rationale in Hall and conclude that a state suing another state is 
acceptable or, like Justice Stevens, have sufficient regard for stare decisis to re-
sist overruling. But it is perhaps equally likely that a conservative in the mold 
of Justice Scalia will vote to eliminate Hall’s expansion of state liability. 
II. THE NEVADA V. HALL DEBATE 
 As Justice Kagan noted at oral argument, the case would be a difficult one 
if decided under the de novo standard of review.66 Although the states ganged 
up on Hall in amicus briefs, it was nonetheless a precedent of some pedigree, 
having been the law for more than 35 years and having been decided by a 6-3 
vote.67 While certainly not unanimous, Hall was not a 5-4 squeaker. Despite its 
lack of a long constitutional pedigree,68 Hall was not regarded as a particularly 
problematic precedent.69 Pursuant to the norms of stare decisis, Hall’s status as 
                                                        
66  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 37–38 (comments of Justice Kagan). 
67  See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 427 (1979) (majority opinion of Justice Stevens joined 
by Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall and Powell with dissenting votes of Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist). 
68  Where a custom, practice or precedent is of sufficiently long standing, Justice Scalia fa-
vored its retention even in the face of compelling arguments that it was outdated, unfair, or 
inconsistent with subsequent legal developments. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of 
Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990) (supporting constitutionality of “tag” or tran-
sient personal jurisdiction by mere service of process within the state notwithstanding com-
plete lack of any other defendant contact with the state) (quote for the practice, “its valida-
tion is its pedigree. . . .”). 
69  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 203 (5th ed. 
2015) (noting matter-of-factly that “The Eleventh Amendment only applies in federal court; 
it does not prevent a state from being sued in its own courts or in another state’s courts” and 
citing Hall without further comment on the decision); RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.12(b)(ii) at 
209–10 (5th ed. 2012) (describing Hall, noting 6-3 vote on the case, and addressing dissent 
only in a footnote); see also id. at 210–11 (noting 2003 Hyatt II decision where “a unani-
mous Court later held [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] does not require Nevada to give full 
faith and credit to California’s statues providing its tax agency with immunity from suit”; 
and “the Constitution does not confer sovereign immunity on states sued in the courts of sis-
ter states.”). 
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precedent put a nontrivial burden on the California Tax Board, which attacked 
Hall as being “poorly reasoned” but failed to demonstrate (or in my view even 
articulate well) any glaring logical errors in or notable ill effects of the deci-
sion. 
 To be sure, the states marshalled a historic attack on Hall, arguing that it 
ran counter to the original understanding of the Founders that states were abso-
lutely immune. But the history of legal attitudes toward sovereign immunity is 
not completely clear. The bulk of the states’ argument in amici was structural 
and foundational, resting on the notion that being subject to suit in another state 
was an impermissible affront to the defendant state. While this may be true, it 
hardly makes Hall unconstitutional. The federal system is not a chivalry code 
demanding that states defer to one another, nor is it a non-aggression pact. 
A. Historical Considerations and the Originalist-Functionalist Divide 
 The historical argument for overturning Hall is mixed. Defenders of Hall 
(of which I am one), have a reasonable argument that even if the “better” histo-
ry suggests that the Founders would not have permitted such suits, the histori-
cal evidence is not so overwhelming as to justify overturning Hall, a decision 
approaching its fortieth anniversary. Unless one is absolutely and fundamental-
ly an originalist—and finds the history clear—history alone does not support 
overturning Hall.70 
 Nonetheless, there is a significant historical/structural argument in favor of 
the sovereign immunity sought by California. As the California Tax Board’s 
counsel noted at oral argument, a ruling in favor of Hyatt on the Hall issue cre-
ates the arguably bizarre situation in which a state is protected from suit in the 
arguably neutral federal courts but subject to the same suit in a state where the 
plaintiff may have a considerable home court advantage.71 Analogizing the is-
sue to Chisholm v. Georgia72 (in which a federal court’s judgment subjecting 
Georgia to repayment of Revolutionary War debts quickly begat the Eleventh 
Amendment), the Tax Board counsel argued that the Nevada Supreme Court 
decision in Hyatt creates a situation in which South Carolinian Chisholm could 
have sued Georgia in his home state even though Georgia had been immunized 
from the suit in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment,73 and in its own 
courts by sovereign immunity. 
                                                        
70  Regarding originalist and non-originalist constitutional interpretation, see CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 69, § 1.4; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 69, ch. 23; see also id. § 2.12(a) at 
206, n.3 (citing to leading scholarly articles concerning the Eleventh Amendment and sover-
eign immunity). 
71  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 16. 
72  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 439 (1793). 
73  But in the absence of the Eleventh Amendment (which has a clear text forbidding suit 
against a state in federal court and which was enacted in reaction to Chisholm but does not 
mention suits in state courts), Plaintiff Chisholm was entitled to sue Georgia in federal court. 
And it should not be forgotten that he was not some gadfly plaintiff seeking massive law re-
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 The Tax Board and its allies also contended that an implicit assumption of 
the Constitution was that states retain their sovereign immunity that predated 
the Constitution, and that, notwithstanding the lack of any express textual pro-
vision of the Constitution, was an implicit but clear part of the constitutional 
bargain to which the states agreed. This argument is not a bad one.74 But the 
Nevada v. Hall dissenters vociferously and ultimately, and unsuccessfully, 
raised this argument more than thirty years ago.75 Furthermore, the Hall posi-
tion enjoys non-trivial textual, historical, and doctrinal support. 
 First, despite the purported consensus embracing what might be termed 
“sovereign super-immunity” (not only in the sovereign’s courts but also wher-
ever the sovereign may have arguably violated the laws of other states or the 
nation), no express language of the Constitution grants such immunity. 
                                                                                                                                 
form at the expense of state sovereignty by seeking federal regulatory dominion over a state. 
Chisholm simply wanted Georgia to pay the debts it concededly owed him. 
To be sure, the Chisholm episode can be invoked to argue that immunity must have been the 
understanding of the founders or the Eleventh Amendment would not have so quickly been 
passed in response to the decision. But countering that is the fact that the Court, which was 
composed of persons present at the founding, saw no problem with permitting the suit to go 
forward in a federal court. The arguably more persuasive view of the Eleventh Amendment 
is that it was an event of political expediency more than constitutional correction. See, e.g., 
JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY viii (1987) (essentially arguing that the states, which had not anticipated 
the cost of the Revolutionary War and of repaying their war debts, used their political muscle 
to avoid federal jurisdiction and thereby “stiff” creditors, knowing that in their own state 
courts, they enjoyed sovereign immunity). This may explain why the Eleventh Amendment 
is textually silent regarding suit in state courts. Although modern Eleventh Amendment ju-
risprudence has broadened the Amendment beyond its text (see, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Flor-
ida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985); 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); and, of course, Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), which refused to give the text of the Amendment, which 
speaks only of suits in federal court, its plain meaning), the Court has never held it to be a 
blanket grant of sovereign immunity and many of the Eleventh Amendment decisions pro-
tecting the states have been controversial. 
74  See Ann Woolhandler, Interstate Sovereign Immunity, 2006 S. CT. REV. 249, 249–50 (ar-
guing that the better historical view is that states did indeed have broad sovereign immunity 
in all state courts at the time of the Founding and that Nevada v. Hall misconstrued this his-
tory). 
75  See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 427–28 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined by 
Justices Burger and Rehnquist, stating “[i]t is important to note that at the time of the Consti-
tutional Convention, as the Court [majority] concedes, there was ‘widespread acceptance of 
the view that a sovereign State is never amenable to suit without its consent’ ” and that im-
munity from suit was viewed as a core element of sovereignty); id. at 437–38 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (joined by Burger but not Blackmun, stating that the nature of constitutional bar-
gain as reflected in drafting and ratification history suggests Founders viewed state sovereign 
immunity as applicable in all courts, not merely courts of the particular sovereign, and that it 
is an “established principle” that a sovereign cannot be sued “ ‘in its own courts, or in any 
other, without its consent and permission.’ ”) (first quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 
529 (1857); and then citing Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 451 
(1883) and Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 74 (1961)). 
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 Second, as Hyatt’s counsel emphasized and Justice Stevens discussed in 
Nevada v. Hall, Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon—a decision made by Justic-
es much closer in time to the ratification of the Constitution—appears to reject 
the contention that sovereign states retain their absolute power outside their 
own courts or boundaries.76 Rather, the foreign sovereign may be granted im-
munity as a matter of comity, like France in Schooner Exchange.77 There, 
France, as a foreign sovereign, could not insist on obtaining immunity from an 
American court.78 Further, the Supreme Court itself expressed no reservations 
about the continued vitality of Hall in its first Hyatt decision in 2003 (Hyatt 
II).79 Presumably, if history were so clearly on the side of California regarding 
this issue, a constitutional problem of this magnitude would have been raised 
by at least one Justice at that time of Schooner Exchange. 
 Third, Chisholm v. Georgia found no immunity from suit in federal courts 
in the absence of the subsequently enacted Eleventh Amendment,80 which is 
directed only to protecting states from suit in federal court. The Rehnquist dis-
sent in Nevada v. Hall regards the passage of the Eleventh Amendment as con-
clusive evidence that the Chisholm Court misunderstood the Founders’ consen-
sus regarding sovereign immunity and mistakenly rejected the views of James 
Madison, John Marshall, and Alexander Hamilton.81 
 However, one can easily make two arguments. First, that the Justices of 
1793 (including John Marshall, who authored the Schooner Exchange opinion) 
were in a better position to assess the Founders’ sentiments about sovereign 
immunity than Justice Rehnquist; and second, that the passage of the Eleventh 
Amendment (which only confers immunity against federal court litigation) was 
an adaptation of the Constitution rather than a reaffirmation of an original un-
derstanding. 
 An amicus brief, authored by Professor Stephen Vladeck and Attorney 
Lindsay Harrison, submitted in Hyatt IV argued (persuasively in my view) that 
Hall was correctly decided and should stand.82 The brief essentially read 
Schooner Exchange as Hyatt did and noted that it would be odd to read Article 
III of the Constitution as expanding state sovereign immunity because Article 
III by definition subjects states to the judicial power of another sovereign (the 
national government), which was not the case prior to the enactment of the 
                                                        
76  Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 122–23 (1812). 
77  Id. 
78  See Hall, 440 U.S. at 416–18. 
79  See Hyatt II, 538 U.S. 488, 497 (2003) (no criticism or concern about Hall expressed; 
Hall cited merely as decided precedent) (“Petitioner does not ask us to reexamine that ruling, 
and we therefore decline the invitation of petitioner’s amici States . . . to do so.”). 
80  Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 420 (1793). 
81  See Hall, 440 U.S. at 436–37. 
82  See Brief for Professors of Federal Jurisdiction as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 
3, Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt (Hyatt IV), 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016) (No. 14-1175).
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Constitution.83 The amicus brief also made the argument (again, compelling in 
my view) that overruling Hall would create an unwise de facto absolute im-
munity for state entities as a matter of constitutional law.84 The alternative, they 
suggest, is that such cases could become subject to the US Supreme Court’s 
original jurisdiction if states were permitted to sue as parens patriae to vindi-
cate the rights of their citizens vis-à-vis another state and were to do so with 
any frequency. But as a practical matter, a right that can only be enforced 
through the Supreme Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction is not likely to be 
a right gaining much serious attention from a judicial institution that does not 
see itself as a forum for merely righting wrongs rather than issuing constitu-
tional pronouncements. 
 Further, as previously noted, the Court itself in Hyatt II in 2003 expressed 
no reservations about the continued vitality of Hall, though they noted that the 
issue was not before the Court.85 One might, in a similar vein, further argue that 
if the Tax Board were to challenge Hall, the time to have done so was during 
Hyatt II. Although perhaps not formally subject to waiver or estoppel, the Tax 
Board’s attack on Hall, more than a decade after it had been sued in Nevada 
state court, seemed belated by 2016. 
 To be sure, at the time of the Hall decision, Hall dissenter Justice 
Rehnquist and others could point to writings of Madison and Hamilton that can 
be read as supporting absolute immunity.86 But these writings do not warn that 
states entering the union might be subject to suit in other member states and ar-
guably do not even touch upon the possibility because their focus was on 
whether state sovereignty would be threatened by the new national govern-
ment.87 It must also be remembered that the Founders, particularly the writers 
of the Federalist Papers, were trying to sell the ratification of the Constitution 
to some often reluctant state audiences.88 It is hardly surprising then that these 
                                                        
83  See id. at 10–12 (also noting that nothing in Article III or other portions of the Constitu-
tion expressly enacts sovereign immunity or limits the jurisdiction of the courts of a state). 
84  See id. at 12–15. 
85  See Hyatt II, 538 U.S. 488, 497 (2003) (“Petitioner [Tax Board] does not ask us to reex-
amine [Nevada v. Hall] and we therefore decline the invitation of petitioner’s amici 
States. . . .”) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206, n.5 (1954)) (“We do not reach for 
constitutional questions not raised by the parties[.]”). 
86  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (taking 
the position that ratification of the Constitution would not undermine traditional state sover-
eign immunity); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (states 
possess a residual sovereignty that is preserved in the Constitution); see CHEMERINSKY, su-
pra note 69, § 1.3 at 11; THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 86, at 411 (Alexander Hamil-
ton). 
87  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 86 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, 
supra note 86 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Randall, supra note 1, at 3 (“much of the his-
torical record addresses whether the states enjoyed immunity from suit in the federal 
courts.”). 
88  The Federalist Papers were a series of essays written between October 1787 and May 
1788 by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay (under the pseudonym Publius) 
to urge voters in New York to support ratification of the proposed Constitution. See Ian 
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authors may have soft-pedaled some implications of union that may not have 
appealed to states’ rights advocates on the fence about whether to ratify. 
 Under these circumstances, the historical argument for the immunity 
sought by the Tax Board in Hyatt is mixed, though arguably favoring immuni-
ty. However, even if the historical argument is correct, it is not conclusive un-
less one is a rigid originalist regarding the Constitution. To the extent one takes 
a functional view of the Constitution or thinks that the original understanding 
of the document may be updated to comport with modern times, the historical 
analysis may give pause but is not compelling. It is certainly not compelling 
enough to warrant overturning Nevada v. Hall, which does not appear to be a 
problematic precedent, however many states may complain in an amicus brief 
about the ravages of having to defend injury-causing conduct in another state’s 
courts. 
B. Constitutional Structure, Federalism and Pragmatic Public Policy 
Concerns 
 Consideration of functional factors provides strong support for retaining 
Nevada v. Hall. 
If one’s view of the Constitution is more evolutionary, even clear historical 
evidence favoring California is not persuasive unless there are structural, textu-
al, and prudential reasons supporting the demise of Hall. There is no constitu-
tional text clearly favoring such a result. The language of the Full Faith and 
                                                                                                                                 
Shapiro, Introduction to THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, 
AND JOHN JAY ix–xxii (explaining that the essays were contained in newspaper articles (that 
we now would describe as op-ed pieces) written as part of an effort to persuade New York to 
ratify the Constitution, and providing additional background regarding the political context 
of the Papers); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s 
Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 248 (2004) (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 
“wrote principally to support the campaign for ratification in New York.”); Chris Carlisle, 
Case Note, State Sovereign Immunity Trumps the Supremacy Clause: Does Federal Law Ap-
ply to the States in the Wake of Alden v. Maine 119 S. Ct. 2240, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 177, 
197, n.143 (1999). Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that these Founders, however 
honest, would be reluctant to emphasize any aspects of the proposed new union that might 
engender opposition from voters or political elites in the state. 
 Also, as Professor Randall has noted, “[b]y the time Hamilton’s statements in The Federalist 
No. 81 appeared, eight states had already ratified,” a history she reads as suggesting that the 
Constitution became effective “without reliance” on assurances that sovereign immunity 
would be preserved). See Randall, supra note 1, at 14; see also id. at 13–16 (noting that the 
strong view of sovereign immunity often attributed to Hamilton and Madison is not strictly 
accurate in view of their other statements and noting statements of other founders in deroga-
tion of sovereign immunity, even from suits in federal court that are not barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment). It should be emphasized that Professor Randall’s very persuasive attack 
on sovereign immunity is directed toward the immunity states enjoy in Federal Court due to 
a (in her view) mistakenly enacted Eleventh Amendment and ensuing two centuries of erro-
neous judicial interpretation of the scope of the Amendment. Even if she is incorrect about 
the issue of state immunity from suit in federal court, her arguments are additional support 
for refusing to immunize states from suit in the courts of a sister state. For a very persuasive 
attack on sovereign immunity generally, see Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 1201. 
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Credit Clause speaks—as the Court noted in its 2016 Hyatt decision—of sym-
metry but it does not establish sovereign immunity.89 On the contrary, prior to 
the Eleventh Amendment, the text in Chisholm v. Georgia was read to permit 
states to be sued in federal court without any immunity.90 
 If one is not an originalist, Hall can be well defended on grounds of consti-
tutional structure and simple fairness. Hall itself involved a badly injured Cali-
fornia minor and his less injured mother (the jury verdict was nearly $8 million 
in today’s dollars) suing Nevada in California state court after a Nevada State 
employee negligently hit them while driving in California.91 In addition to re-
jecting the argument that Nevada did not have to answer for its alleged tortious 
conduct in the courts of another state, the Hall Court rejected the argument that 
Nevada’s own limited waiver of sovereign immunity (then $25,000 pursuant to 
the same Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.035(1) at issue in Hyatt) precluded greater recov-
ery by the victims in California’s own courts, which imposed no bar to recov-
ery and no cap on damages for this type of liability.92 
 According to the Nevada v. Hall critics, states have sometimes been sued 
for conduct causing injury in other states, placing legal and financial pressure 
on the states.93 But the empirical burden of such litigation is far from clear and 
hardly seems oppressive.94 Further, the “wrongfulness” of such a situation is 
                                                        
89  See Hyatt IV, 136 S. Ct. 1277, 1281 (2016) (noting that the Clause “does not require a 
State to substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the statute of 
another State reflecting a conflicting and opposed policy.”) (citing Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 
408, 412 (1955)). 
90  See, e.g., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 451 (1793). The vote in Chisholm 
was 4-1, suggesting that as a legal matter, jurists present at the founding had little concern 
that states enjoined absolute sovereign immunity. But as a political matter, the decision was 
unpalatable, but perhaps due to events post-dating the drafting and ratification of the found-
ing. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 69, § 2.12(a) at 207–08 (noting that “fear of suits 
by Tory creditors” was one of the reasons animating the Eleventh Amendment and “[w]hile 
the individual state debts to British citizens and loyalists were not great, increasing tensions 
with Great Britain [that would culminate in the War of 1812] created fear of debts arising 
from a new conflict and an animosity towards paying any such claims.”). 
91  See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 411 (1979). 
92  See id. at 425–27. 
93  See, e.g., States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 31; Associations Amicus Brief, supra 
note 63, at 3. The Associations Amicus Brief is directed almost exclusively at the Full Faith 
and Credit issue but implicitly criticizes Hall as creating risky financial exposure for sover-
eigns. 
94  The States' Amicus Briefs complaining about the impact of Hall are long on generality 
and short on specifics. Relatively few cases of what might be termed “Hall” liability for the 
states are cited, and they appear to involve a collectively modest amount of financial liability 
relative to the states’ fisc. See States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 23–26 (citing three cas-
es regarded as exercising jurisdiction over foreign state governments “in cases that involve 
sensitive policy decisions” and five cases where “money judgments have been entered 
against States or state entities by the courts of other States” yet contending that such situa-
tions are “numerous”); Associations Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 19 (broadly stating that 
“the resources required to defend against suits across various States could and likely would 
be exorbitant, and may even impede the effective functioning of government” but citing no 
data on the exposure created by Hall or that would be created in the absence of restrictions 
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hardly self-evident. One can make at least as compelling a case that, barring 
redress to a victim in the courts of the victim’s own state (assuming the tortfea-
sor state has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state), is equally or 
more troubling. 
 For example, the state amici favoring the Tax Board cited, as examples of 
unfairness, a “multi-million dollar verdict against a Pennsylvania prison,”95 a 
“$600,000 judgment against the State of Maryland after an accident involving a 
deputy sheriff,”96 a “$1.75 million damages judgment against a subdivision of 
New Jersey in a case arising from bridge maintenance,”97 and a “$225,000 
judgment against a subdivision of Utah after an arrest and imprisonment.”98 
                                                                                                                                 
such as the Nevada damages cap of N.R.S. 41.035); see also Cty. of Clark ex rel. U. Med. 
Ctr. v. Upchurch, 961 P.2d 754, 758 (Nev. 1998) (stating that there would be “massive and 
deleterious effect upon state and local treasuries” in the absence of statutory damage caps). 
95  See States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 25 (citing Reynolds v. Lancaster Cty. Prison, 
739 A.2d 413, 417 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999)). In Reynolds, a guard dog business 
owner was given a dog by the prison but no warning about the dog’s dangerous propensities, 
including five previous vicious attacks, two within days of the dog’s delivery to the plain-
tiffs. The business owner and a contractor were attacked and badly injured, with bites 
through the skin and to the bone in what appears to have been a life-or-death struggle to es-
cape the dog. They sued for relief, with the court determining damages and finding that the 
prison was 75 percent at fault. This hardly sounds like an instance were the state actor—
which essentially dumped a killer dog on an unsuspecting vendor—was treated unfairly be-
cause of Nevada v. Hall. 
96  See States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 25 (citing Kent Cty. v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 
290, 304 (Del. 1998)). In Shepherd, the deputy (who was working on a routine investigation 
and not responding to an emergency) rear-ended a stopped vehicle at sufficiently high speed 
to inflict substantial injuries. Again, hardly a seemingly unfair result due to Hall. 
97  See States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 25 (citing Laconis v. Burlington Cty. Bridge 
Comm’n, 583 A.2d 1218, 1220–23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)). In Laconis, plaintiff was rendered 
paralyzed when his car hydroplaned in water retained in a depression located on a portion of 
road found to be negligently maintained by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The court 
found the state 51 percent negligent to Mr. Laconis’s 49 percent negligence (in a bench trial) 
and noted that the state knew of the road’s disrepair and dangerousness during rainfall but 
had provided no warning. Are the States supporting the Tax Board and urging repeal of Hall 
really suggesting that this is an unfair result and that the crippled Plaintiff Laconis should be 
denied relief or paid only a fraction of the value of the judgment he would otherwise obtain? 
98  See States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 25–26 (citing Hernandez v. City of Salt Lake, 
686 P.2d 251, 252–53 (Nev. 1984)). In Hernandez, plaintiff prevailed in false arrest claim 
after he was falsely imprisoned during the course of a burglary investigation for forty-two 
days based on the suspect’s testimony of two purported “roommates” who disappeared. Salt 
Lake persisted in pursuing extradition and imprisoning Hernandez despite concerns ex-
pressed by the Reno district attorney when Hernandez offered proof that he was working at a 
local casino at the time of the burglary. Cases like Hernandez make a better case for Hall 
than for its demise. 
Another case cited by the States supporting the Tax Board—Struebin v. Illinois, 421 N.W.2d 
874, 875 (Iowa 1988)—is more troubling in that it permitted two estates to sue for alleged 
negligent maintenance of a portion of interstate highway located in Iowa but maintained by 
Illinois subject to an interstate compact. Trial in Iowa state court produced two judgments 
totaling $118,000 but Illinois refused to pay these claims on the ground that they were time-
barre under Illinois state law. But Iowa permitted garnishment of taxes owed Illinois by an 
Illinois corporation with facilities in Iowa. See States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 25. 
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 At the risk of being insufficiently sensitive to Goliath, my response is “so 
what?” In each of these cases it appears that government actors did bad things 
that hurt innocent people. Under such circumstances, the law should provide 
compensation for the inflicted injuries without reduction simply because of the 
identity of the defendant. 
 Imagine how appalled the average American would be if there were differ-
ential limits on damages based solely on the identity of private defendants (e.g., 
no damage caps for a plaintiff suing author Dennis Lehane, of Mystic River, 
Day for Night, and other successful crime fiction for defamation, but damage 
caps if Michael Connolly, creator of fictional Los Angeles detective Harry 
Bosch, is sued for the same statements). A damages cap, if permissible dispar-
ate treatment at all, should have empirical support. But states routinely assert 
merely that such caps are necessary without any presenting any supporting 
facts. 
 It also should not be forgotten—but is frequently overlooked or ignored in 
debates over sovereign immunity—that a suit against a government is merely a 
claim. The claim does not result in government liability unless the claimant 
shoulders the burden of proving that the government did something wrong. 
Critics of Hall act as if permitting suits against a government entity imposes a 
regime of strict liability which is, of course, incorrect. To be sure, there are de-
fense expenditures occasioned when sued, but this is the case in a regime of 
damage caps and even in a regime of total immunity in that the state will at 
least need to file a motion to dismiss or summary judgment motion in order to 
assert its purported immunity. Further, juries hearing Hall-permitted claims 
against a government, even if not directly impacted by any tax consequences of 
a judgment against a foreign state, are aware that undue generosity in compen-
sating victims will have fiscal consequences. 
 Overruling Nevada v. Hall would open the door to a situation in which 
states outside the forum state could inflict substantial intentional harm on fo-
rum state citizens—and even the forum states themselves—with the victims 
having essentially no recourse. In a nation of purportedly inter-connected and 
cooperative states, such a dog-eat-dog view of interstate relations simply seems 
                                                                                                                                 
While this may seem unfair and overreaching, it is to a large extent the mere consequence of 
the law’s longstanding treatment of limitations periods, in which such limitations of a state 
are applied in the state’s own courts even if the dispute largely involves matters outside the 
state and is subject to another state’s substantive law pursuant to prevailing choice of law 
principles. See JEFFREY W. STEMPEL ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE 242–43 (2d ed. 
2015); see, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778–81 (1984) (defamation 
plaintiff whose suit against magazine is foreclosed by two-year limitations periods in Ohio 
and New York, jurisdictions most relevant to the substantive claim, sues in New Hampshire 
to obtain the benefit of that state’s unusually long statute of limitation (six years) applicable 
to defamation actions and succeeds in establishing personal jurisdiction based on relatively 
small number of magazines sold in New Hampshire). This treatment of limitations periods 
can be criticized, of course. But it is the longstanding and prevailing judicial approach. And 
it is this approach—at least as much as Hall—that accounts for the situation decried by the 
States Amicus Brief in Struebin v. Illinois. 
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wrong. But, of course, states compete for commerce, population, tourists, fed-
eral funds, professional sports teams, and all manner of wealth and stature. As a 
general matter, the Constitution and the courts should not be taking sides in 
these battles,99 even if Congress and the Executive often do. 
 In the absence of the Constitution and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
each sovereign state presumably has the right to entertain suits against anyone 
from private individuals to other states in its courts. If the Clause is construed 
to bar Nevada from hearing a claim against a California government entity (as 
in Hyatt), or vice versa (as in Hall), the Constitution—rather than the forum 
state presumably having ultimate power within its borders—would in effect be 
used to mandate immunity for another state inflicting injury within the forum 
state. 
 As a functional matter, this is not good public policy. Imagine if California 
were intentionally dumping exposed, untreated radioactive waste onto Nevada 
land and into the Nevada water table. Should Nevada be prevented from seek-
ing legal recourse? Overturning Nevada v. Hall would allow such a troubling 
result. Nevada then could not sue California in Nevada’s own courts and could 
not sue in federal court because of the Eleventh Amendment. California (or any 
intentionally polluting state) could only be called to account for its misconduct 
if it consented to suit in its own courts, an unlikely event if the polluting state 
was intending to transport its problems to the victimized state. 
 An overruling of Nevada v. Hall would also open the way to the troubling 
possibility of states targeting and persecuting residents of another state,	which 
is exactly what Gilbert Hyatt alleged occurred in connection with his tax sta-
                                                        
99  The Constitution has, unfortunately, some provisions that do take sides and advantage 
some states at the expense of others. Perhaps the most glaring examples is the Electoral Col-
lege, which violates principles of equal protection and one person/one vote by providing 
greater voice in presidential elections to more sparsely populated states. Although the Col-
lege has traditionally been regarded as a means of protecting less populated rural states from 
dominance by the more settled coastal states, scholars increasingly have regarded the Col-
lege as part of the Constitution’s accommodation of slavery in that it, like the Fugitive Slave 
Clause and the Three-Fifths Clause, aides the slave states of the American South by putting 
southern electoral votes on a par with those of the North. See Paul Finkelman, The Proslav-
ery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145, 1146–47 (2002) (“The elec-
toral college is of course based in part on the three-fifths clause. Thus there is an immediate 
connection between slavery and the electoral college.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Troubling 
Reason the Electoral College Exists, TIME (Nov. 8, 2016), http://time.com/4558510/electoral 
-college-history-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/SUV9-KJXQ] (“Standard civics-class accounts of 
the Electoral College rarely mention the real demon dooming direct national election in 1787 
and 1803: slavery. . . . [I]n a direct election system, the North would outnumber the South, 
whose many slaves (more than half a million in all) of course could not vote. But the Elec-
toral College . . . instead let each southern state count its slaves, albeit with a two-fifths dis-
count, in computing its share of the overall count [of electoral votes per state].”). For exam-
ple, the “free state of Pennsylvania had 10% more free persons than Virginia, but got 20% 
fewer electoral votes.” As Amar further notes: “Perversely, the more slaves Virginia (or any 
other slave state) bought or bred, the more electoral votes it would receive. Were a slave 
state to free any blacks who then moved North, the state could actually lose electoral votes.” 
Id. 
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tus—contentions with which a jury largely agreed. Had Hyatt been an average 
citizen (and not a multi-millionaire able to retain counsel at his own expense), 
he probably would have simply had to suffer in silence, all the while continuing 
to fight the Tax Board on its home turf in California. 
 Imagine if a state governor became annoyed with an out-of-state critic. 
State authorities might engage in tremendous harassment of the critic, who 
would have little legal recourse—due to the Governor’s immunity or the pro-
tection of caps in his own state—if not permitted to sue the persecuting state in 
another state forum. To be sure, questions of personal jurisdiction, justiciabil-
ity, comity, and remedy could be difficult and might effectively bar the victim’s 
quest for justice in particular cases. But at least the persecuting state would not 
be permitted to inflict harm in other jurisdictions without being called to an-
swer for its conduct. 
 The common sense of the notion that there should be a remedy, or at least a 
right to be heard and have the facts adjudicated, for every wrong—even wrongs 
committed by the sovereign—is ingrained in the American legal system. It de-
serves at least as much deference as the increasingly outmoded concept that the 
king can do no wrong. Consequently, it is a bit difficult (at least for me) to em-
pathize with the ire and “sky is falling” apocalyptic vision proffered by critics 
of Nevada v. Hall. 
 California and its allies emphasized a structural argument for overturning 
Hall, in essence arguing that permitting Hall actions against a state is simply 
too inconsistent with the status of states as sovereigns and the federal system 
respecting state autonomy. The amicus brief of states supporting California ar-
gues that Hall is pernicious because it offends the “dignity” of the states if they 
must answer in another court for their activities,100 then lists a number of cases 
in which forum states or their citizens sued a foreign state over alleged foreign 
state negligence or intentional misconduct causing damages in the forum 
state.101 For example, Nevada has sued Wisconsin for purportedly improper 
discharge of a sex offender committing assault in Nevada,102 while Kansas 
                                                        
100  See States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 21 (“Failure to accord this immunity [from 
Hall-type suits] subjects a State to ‘the indignity of . . . the coercive process of judicial tribu-
nals at the instance of private parties’ ” and “allows for ‘unanticipated intervention in the 
processes of government. . . .’ ”) (first quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 US. 706, 749 (1999), an 
Eleventh Amendment case; then quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887); and then 
quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944)). 
101  Id. 
102  See id. (citing Mianecki v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 658 P.2d 422, 425 (Nev. 1983)). 
In Mianecki, a victim of a sexual assault sued Wisconsin for failure to warn the public and 
failure to supervise the perpetrator, who was granted probation after conviction in Wisconsin 
and permitted to move to Nevada. The failure to warn claim had particular strength in this 
case in that the perpetrator’s probationer had moved in with the family whose minor son was 
the eventual victim, and had received no warning. The assault was not one randomly occur-
ring on the street. The Nevada Supreme Court permitted the action to proceed, rejecting 
Wisconsin’s immunity defense. Mianecki, 658 P.2d at 423. It grieves me that 43 State Attor-
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courts have permitted a case to proceed in which a Kansas resident alleged in-
jury by Missouri law enforcement personnel in connection with serving a war-
rant.103 In a perhaps ironic twist on the Hall issue, San Francisco sought dam-
ages from Nevada over a state hospital’s former practice of busing unwanted 
mentally ill patients to San Francisco (the matter has settled for $400,000).104 
The States supporting the Tax Board decry such claims as a fiscal burden at 
odds with constitutional structure but never bother to explain why the victims 
in these cases should not be permitted to seek recompense in court. 
 One does not have to be a rabid consumer advocate to find unmoving the 
States’ apocalyptic arguments in favor of immunity. According to the immuni-
ty-craving states, since Nevada v. Hall, states have sometimes been sued in 
other state courts for conduct causing injury in those states. What on earth is 
wrong with that? Should tortfeasors not have to account for the injury they in-
flict—in at least some sort of judicial forum (where erroneously accused de-
fendant states will presumably be accorded due process and vindicated through 
adjudication)? Overruling Nevada v. Hall would open the door to a situation in 
which states outside the forum state could inflict substantial intentional harm 
                                                                                                                                 
neys General think this a bad result and a bad decision. One wonders whether these law en-
forcement officials would feel the same way had one of their children had been the victim. 
103  See States Amicus Brief, supra note 63, at 24 (citing Head v. Platte Cty., 749 P.2d 6, 7–8, 
10 (Kan. 1988)). In Head, Overland Park, Kansas, police arrested the plaintiff at her home 
based on a Missouri warrant with an erroneous description of the suspect that roughly 
matched the plaintiff (i.e., 5’10”, 120-pound white female in her mid-20s, brown hair, green 
eyed) but the complaining party’s description of the suspect had included no such descrip-
tion and characterized the suspect as a white female who was “[o]verweight, bleached blond 
hair, capped teeth” with an address in Shawnee Mission, Kansas. No explanation for the de-
scription error was provided. “Mrs. Head denied she was the person who had written the 
[bad] check [yes, Platte County really wanted to arrest someone over a bounced check].” Af-
ter confirmation of the warrant “by the Platte County Sheriff’s Department . . . Mrs. Head’s 
husband was required to come home from work to take care of their baby and Phyllis Head 
was handcuffed and transported to the Overland Park jail where she was booked, held, and 
eventually released.” See Head, 749 P.2d at 7–8. 
The matter arose out of the complaint of a “Missouri merchant” on May 2, 1984 but the 
court’s opinion does not state the amount of the bounced check. Unless the amount is astro-
nomical, the entire incident smacks more of debtor’s prison than effective law enforcement. 
As with the other cases cited by Tax Board amici, I find nothing troubling about requiring 
government perpetrators of injury to defend their conduct in the courts of the victim’s state 
and to pay damages where the conduct cannot be justified or excused. 
104  See Maria Castellucci, Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hospital Faces Lawsuit Over Patient-
Dumping Practices, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Dec. 27, 2016), 
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20161227/NEWS/161229957 
[https://perma.cc/2JUB-3WQ4] (noting settlement of that case, lack of success in similar 
case, and third action recently filed arising out of alleged practice of Nevada facility dis-
charging patients involuntarily and then sending them “to locations out-of-state without any 
health services prepared for them.”). Of twenty-four such patients bused to San Francisco, 
“20 required emergency medical care within a short time after their arrival” and also needed 
housing, according to San Francisco authorities. See Nevada to Pay San Francisco $400,000 
in ‘Patient Dumping’ Settlement, CBS SF BAY AREA (Oct. 27, 2015, 9:03 PM), 
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/10/27/nevada-san-francisco-patient-dumping-
settlement/ [https://perma.cc/UW9N-YJXT]. 
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on forum state citizens—and even the forum states themselves—with the vic-
tims having essentially no recourse. 
 What if, for example, the California Tax Board dispatched a SWAT team 
over the border to invade Hyatt’s home, conduct a strip search, trash the house, 
and shoot the family dog (the alleged misconduct in Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics and Coordination Unit, but inflicted in the victims’ home 
state105)? Should foreign state agency activity of that sort really be beyond the 
reach of not only the state’s own courts and the federal courts, but also the 
courts of the state in which the victim resides? If Nevada had been more gener-
ous to its own citizens victimized by intentional misconduct of its own state 
agencies (rather than implementing the $50,000 cap), the inequity of the situa-
tion would be even greater. 
 An argument in favor of Hyatt posits that concerns about federal coercive 
power are reduced, if not eliminated, when states entertain suits against other 
states in the first state’s court, in that these roughly co-equal sovereigns have an 
implicit practical reason not to treat one another unfairly. Nevada’s own judi-
cial conduct has arguably reflected this. The Nevada Supreme Court closely po-
liced the evidentiary rulings, legal decisions, and jury instructions of the trial 
court in Hyatt III. While not completely immunizing the Tax Board or capping 
its damages, Nevada’s judiciary protected the Board from punitive damages in 
a case even though a jury found the Board’s conduct toward Hyatt sufficiently 
reprehensible to render a quarter-billion dollar punitive damages award.106 
 One could perhaps characterize the jury’s large damages award as a large 
serving of “home cooking” to the Tax Board in famously tax-averse Nevada. 
But Hyatt is hardly a popular native son like Andre Agassi or Paul Laxalt, and 
is a multi-millionaire to boot. Under these circumstances, normal deference to 
jury decision-making would seem to suggest that the Tax Board engaged in 
troublesome misconduct and that the Nevada jurors were not simply assigning 
liability to the Tax Board because it was a nonresident government entity. 
 Two other factors limit a state’s ability to unfairly impose civil liability up-
on another state. To perhaps state the obvious, the forum state’s law must pro-
vide for relief. The forum state cannot (at least without violating the Constitu-
tion) maintain a cause of action peculiar to foreign states. A resident plaintiff 
like Hyatt must be able to fit his allegations of harm into an existing general 
legal construct in order to recover. This in turn means that the plaintiff’s claim 
against the foreign state must be one sufficiently within the legal mainstream to 
warrant relief under legal doctrine that is equally applicable to in-state defend-
ants, governmental or private. 
 The forum state is unlikely to subject its own residents (individuals or enti-
ties) to unduly broad or bizarre liability schemes, which means that subjecting 
                                                        
105  Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
164–65 (1993). 
106  See discussion supra Section I.C. 
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foreign state defendants to unduly broad or bizarre liability regimes is unlikely. 
The foreign state agency will, of course, wish it had absolute immunity or the 
protection of a damages cap. But this hardly means it is unfair for the forum 
state to subject the foreign state entity to liability—at least to the extent that 
similarly situated forum state entities face such liability for similar misconduct. 
 A second factor mitigating the risk that a forum state will unfairly perse-
cute the foreign state entity defendant is the requirement that such a defendant 
be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the forum state. Without such personal 
jurisdiction, the forum state judgment against a foreign state entity lacks due 
process and any resulting judgment is not subject to enforcement in the foreign 
state pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In Hyatt, the Tax Board was 
obviously subject to personal jurisdiction because it intentionally reached well 
into Nevada to pursue Mr. Hyatt, purportedly using its agents to survey his 
home, rifle through his garbage, and contact neighbors about his activities. 
 If the Tax Board’s allegedly harassing activities stopped at the California 
border, Hyatt could not have subsequently sued the Tax Board in Nevada and 
obtained a judgment enforceable in California—or presumably in any other 
state applying the Supreme Court’s recent personal jurisdiction law as ex-
pressed in Walden v. Fiore, which found mere knowledge of impact upon the 
plaintiff in the forum state (Nevada, once again) insufficient to sustain the ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction consistent with due process.107 
 On a doctrinal level, the Hyatt III Nevada Supreme Court position is also 
quite strong in that, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause has historically been 
vigorously enforced to require states to honor the judgments of another state (so 
long as the judgment met the requirements of due process), the Clause has not 
enjoyed similarly vigorous enforcement regarding the laws of the other states. 
So long as the forum state is competent to legislate in the area of law at issue, it 
need not displace its own law with the law of another state. Where the forum 
state’s own public policy would be violated by application of the law of another 
state, the forum state need not apply that law. Indeed, this is what the Court 
stated in Nevada v. Hall and reiterated in its first Hyatt decision in 2003.108 
 If the attack on Nevada v. Hall had prevailed in the US Supreme Court’s 
2016 Hyatt IV decision, it would appear that a state can commit even barbarous 
acts against a resident of another state and never be civilly liable, so long as it 
has absolute immunity in the courts of the tortfeasor state. Although there are 
some practical political brakes on such a doomsday scenario, in that the tortfea-
sor state’s body politic might not let such a regime stand for very long, the 
track record of the states provides comparatively little comfort. To explain, 
most states place substantial limits on their own liability that do not apply to 
misconduct by private actors. 
                                                        
107  See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014). 
108  See Hyatt II, 538 U.S. 488, 497 (2003). 
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 Governments are pretty good at protecting their own interests on their own 
political turf, even if this seems contrary to the public interest. Providing at 
least some forum in which the arguable misconduct of state entities can be 
called into account by the judiciary would seem the better public policy. The 
obvious counterargument is that the greater public interest lies in protecting the 
public fisc in that it is taxpayers of a state that will pay larger tort or breach of 
contract damages if a waiver of sovereign immunity is uncapped. Where a gov-
ernment, economy, or society is genuinely poor and of limited resources, the 
argument would have significant traction. But it becomes unpersuasive in a 
comparatively wealthy nation like the United States. 
III. HALL—AND HYATT—AS A JURISPRUDENTIAL BATTLEGROUND 
 Judicial assessments of the interstate sovereign immunity question almost 
certainly vary according to the jurisprudence of the beholder. If one thinks the 
ability of any person or entity to be “above the law” should be limited or elimi-
nated, the resolution is clear: states should not be able to avoid answering for 
their conduct in other states to which they are subject to personal jurisdiction 
unless they can convince the forum state court that comity is required. Already, 
a state unwilling to be responsible for inflicting injury is immune in its own and 
federal courts. 
 Perhaps the strongest argument for preserving Hall is pragmatic. Overturn-
ing Hall would drastically reduce the incentive of state agencies to behave 
properly, or at least confine misbehavior to home state borders. If one supports 
the concept of a living, evolving Constitution, one also presumably favors re-
taining Hall because Hall better reflects modern attitudes critical of sovereign 
immunity and the modern situation in which government is larger and more ac-
tive (and therefore capable of inflicting more harm as well as more benefit) 
than was the case in 1787. If one sees the law as a vehicle for vindicating rights 
and achieving corrective justice, Hall also makes sense. 
 Alternatively, if one sees the law as a vehicle for preserving order and hier-
archy, Hall is problematic, and perhaps sufficiently problematic to warrant 
overruling it because it makes states more vulnerable to suit, with less predicta-
ble results than if the state is permitted to control its exposure through decree-
ing itself absolutely immune or limiting its exposure through damage caps or 
other legislative devices. And if one is an originalist, there is substantial (even 
if not necessarily compelling) evidence supporting the view that absolute sov-
ereign immunity was a background assumption of the Founders. 
 The Supreme Court relied upon Nevada v. Hall in unanimously deciding 
Hyatt II.109 But the Court in Hyatt IV was perilously close to overturning 
Hall.110 What has prompted this shift? Perhaps concern that things have gotten 
out of hand, with Nevada rendering a huge award to a resident multi-
                                                        
109  See generally id. 
110  See generally Hyatt IV, 136 S. Ct. 1277 (2016). 
18 NEV. L.J. 61, STEMPEL- FINAL 1/2/18  10:45 AM 
92 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:61  
millionaire against another state for misconduct that the jury found serious but 
in which no one died or lost a life savings. But an observer might also suspect 
that the Court’s originalists and the Justices favoring authority over individual 
rights to seek recompense are now in a stronger position to reconsider Hall than 
was the case in 2003, particularly with the replacement of Hyatt II author Jus-
tice O’Connor with Justice Alito, who favored overturning Hall. 
 The Court’s decisions in Alden v. Maine,111 and Seminole Tribe of Florida 
v. Florida,112 arguably reflect doctrinal shift but both predate Hyatt II. Alden 
held that the national government did not have Article I constitutional power to 
require that state courts entertain a suit to enforce a federal cause of action 
(wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act),113 while Seminole 
Tribe found no Article I congressional power to abrogate state sovereign im-
munity in federal court.114 Both are also distinguishable as Article I or Eleventh 
Amendment cases rather than Full Faith and Credit Clause cases. In addition, 
Alden was a 5-4 decision, suggesting that there had not been a total turn against 
Hall,115 although it foreshadowed the continued deep division of the Court re-
garding interstate relations and immunity. 
IV. THINKING MORE SERIOUSLY ABOUT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
 The Hyatt IV ruling requiring Nevada to give California the benefit of the 
forum state caps when facing suit was a defeat for Gilbert Hyatt but may have 
the silver lining of prompting reconsideration of state damage caps. One cannot 
help but think back to John Hall, the California boy badly brain-damaged in 
1968 due to the negligent driving of a Nevada employee (who, compounding 
the tragedy, died from the collision).116 Even the million-dollar judgment in 
Hall’s favor may have been insufficient compensation for such severe injury 
that would be with the victim for decades. An award of $25,000, $50,000, or 
even $100,000 for such injuries—the various amounts of Nevada’s ceiling on 
damages against the state during the past forty years—should trouble a “civi-
lized [nation]” (Justice Taney’s words in Beers v. Arkansas117 quoted in Justice 
Rehnquist’s Hall dissent)118 at least as much as the prospect of one state having 
to endure the “indignity” of answering for such injuries in the court of another. 
                                                        
111  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
112  Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
113  Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
114  See Seminole Tribe of Florida, 517 U.S. at 47–48. 
115  See Alden, 527 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
116  See generally, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
117  See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857). 
118  See Hall, 440 U.S. at 432–37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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A. The Questionable Case for Sovereign Immunity 
 Although it is well established, the case for sovereign immunity has always 
rested on a questionable rationale which has only weakened over time. The 
stated rationale for the doctrine was originally the infallibility of the sover-
eign.119 In modern times, the rationale has changed to protect the public fisc by 
reducing government exposure to damage awards.120 The modern rationale for 
sovereign immunity is every bit as problematic as the original “the king can do 
no wrong” rationale. 
 The normative problem with sovereign immunity, one which I am always 
astonished does not receive more attention, is that it treats similarly situated lit-
igants differently—something at odds with the law’s aspiration to provide con-
sistent and fair treatment to litigants. While perhaps stopping short of being an 
equal protection violation, this is clearly disparate treatment that is hard to jus-
tify. To take an example from the type of tort at issue in Nevada v. Hall, if an 
individual injures a person through negligent driving, the individual is respon-
sible for the injured person’s damages. If a corporate driver causes injury, both 
the driver and the company are responsible for the damages. But under a sover-
eign immunity regime, the same negligent driving performed by a government 
worker causing the same injuries to the same victim results in either no or lim-
ited damage awards to the victim. 
 The same inconsistency occurs with the type of actions at issue in Hyatt. If 
another citizen egregiously invaded Hyatt’s privacy—and certainly if there was 
physical assault such as a SWAT home invasion—there would be individual 
liability for all proximately caused damages. There would be similar liability 
imposed upon any corporation that roughed up customers or members of the 
public, or improperly pried into their lives. But under a sovereign immunity re-
gime, governments and government agents get to do this with impunity or pay 
for only a fraction of the injuries inflicted upon the victim. 
 Such inconsistency violates the concept of equal protection even if courts 
often stop short of finding a constitutional violation. And it is immoral. As a 
general rule, in a civilized society, all persons should be accorded the same 
treatment under law. Sovereign immunity or limits on sovereign liability facial-
ly flunks this basic “no one is above the law” normative test and should be 
permitted only if justified by compelling empirical or public policy rationales.  
 The empirical/policy argument for special treatment of the sovereign state 
is generally based on two arguments: (1) a purported need to protect the gov-
                                                        
119  See BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 235; see also DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW 71–128 (2005) (providing overview of history and evolution 
of the doctrine); Randall, supra note 1, at 26–30 (also suggesting that U.S. courts read 
Blackstone too broadly, that he was referring largely to pleading practice, and that English 
law contained several means of avoiding sovereign immunity). 
120  See Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 109 (Tex. 2012) (Lehrmann, J., dissent-
ing) (“sovereign immunity’s modern rationale is the protection of the public fisc. . . .”); Ran-
dall, supra note 1, at 97–103; see also DOERNBERG, supra note 119. 
18 NEV. L.J. 61, STEMPEL- FINAL 1/2/18  10:45 AM 
94 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:61  
ernment treasury (and by extension a need to protect taxpayers from the cost of 
liability); and (2) a purported need to prevent government actors from being 
excessively timid in the performance of their jobs, which allegedly inures to the 
benefit of the public.121 Both arguments are weak and chronically exaggerated 
by proponents of limitations on sovereign liability. 
 The financial argument, although superficially compelling, of course 
founders on the shoals of any decent human’s normative sensibilities. Should a 
government really be allowed to hound, run over, beat up, or commit malprac-
tice upon a person with limited or no consequences simply to allow the taxpay-
ers of the tortfeasor government to save a few bucks in taxes? 
 Promising lower taxes through limited liability or immunity may be good 
politics but it is ethically reprehensible. As put by the George Bernard Shaw 
quote at the beginning of this article, a government that wants to rob Peter to 
pay Paul can always count on the support of Paul,122 and politicians will often 
find it expedient to gain the support of a majority at the expense of a minority. 
But this is a reason to permit courts to decide claims on the merits regardless of 
the defendant’s identity rather than an argument for closing courthouse doors or 
limiting relief merely because of the status of a defendant. In the case of sover-
eign immunity, a government can get away with trashing Peter with impunity 
in order to enjoy the support of a sea of Pauls who are not asked to pay for their 
government’s infliction of injury and who are lucky enough not to suffer Pe-
ter’s fate. 
 But this hardly makes it right. By similar logic, a government could seize 
the property of some citizens in order to build a road desired by other citizens 
who seek a shorter commute to work. The Framers found this possibility so re-
volting that they crafted the Fifth Amendment (which subsequently became ap-
plicable to state governments via the Fourteenth Amendment123) to require 
                                                        
121  See, e.g., GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 107–230 
(2016) (discussing background and policy for federal sovereign immunity as well as statuto-
ry exceptions); Katherine Florey, Sovereign Immunity’s Penumbras: Common Law, “Acci-
dent,” and Policy in the Development of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 765, 771–76 (2008) (reviewing sovereign immunity generally and state sovereign im-
munity in particular); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budg-
ets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1154–56 (2016) (empirical examination of 
financial consequences of suits against local governments and finding that through insurance 
or self-insurance, these entities are not fiscally threatened by liability in cases of federal con-
stitutional claims for which they lack state sovereign immunity); Fred Smith, Local Sover-
eign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 409 (2016) (finding local governments well pro-
tected by doctrinal defenses available). 
122  See, e.g., GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, EVERYBODY’S POLITICAL WHAT’S WHAT? ch. 30 
(1944), cited in Michael Moncur’s (Cynical) Quotations: Quotation #179, THE QUOTATIONS 
PAGE, www.quotationspage.com/quote/179.html [https://perma.cc/RF89-J8XS] (last visited 
Oct. 14, 2017). 
123  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 69, § 7.1 at 569 (Fifth Amendment taking clause and due 
process rights applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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compensation to those whose property is taken for government use.124 The state 
(and its subdivisions) should similarly be held responsible when its actions 
cause other sorts of injury to some of the populace. 
 Empirically, the “protect the fisc” argument also appears very weak. As 
noted above, the forty amicus briefs filed by states supporting the California 
Tax Board in Hyatt IV contained more than a few examples of states being sued 
for causing injury.125 Any list of such cases, no matter how long, ignores the 
issue of whether a state should be responsible for the injuries it inflicts—the 
normative argument again. Additionally, citing a few cases of government lia-
bility hardly suggests that the cumulative financial burden of such liability pos-
es a significant financial threat to the government or to the taxpayers. 
 Data on the issue is hard to find, in large part because limited state liability 
is so pervasive that one cannot know with precision what the total bill might be 
if governments were forced to play by the same liability rules as ordinary citi-
zens and most commercial actors. A full survey of the state of claims against 
governments is beyond the scope of this article, but even a cursory look sug-
gests that sovereign immunity or limited liability flunks any reasonable empiri-
cal test. There is little evidence suggesting that government operations would 
be significantly diminished, must less imperiled, if governments were held ac-
countable for their wrongs in the same manner as persons or entities. Fortunate-
ly, government actors ordinarily perform their jobs well and do not cause inju-
ry, particularly serious injury. Although in the absence of immunity, there 
could be occasional large damage awards, this is unlikely to present a fiscal 
problem for even a relatively small state. 
 Consider Nevada, with a population of roughly 2.9 million persons and an 
annual budget of roughly $11.5 billion.126 Even the massive Hyatt damages 
award (after reduction on appeal), is less than 1 percent of this amount. And, of 
                                                        
124  The presence of the Fifth Amendment (and to some extent other parts of the Bill of 
Rights) as well as the early Supreme Court decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 
(1793), (discussed above) permitting a state to be sued in federal court in connection with a 
debt, undermines the originalist contention that the Framers would have disagreed with Ne-
vada v. Hall. If the Framers so loved government immunity, why did they thwart it through 
the Fifth Amendment in the context of government takings of property? To be sure, 
Chisholm v. Georgia was repudiated by the swift passage of the Eleventh Amendment—but 
this appears to have been driven by the peculiar problem of state fears of being required to 
repay Revolutionary War debts more than any sound jurisprudential basis for protecting 
states from litigation. See ORTH, supra note 73, at viii. I must concede, however, that in clos-
ing the federal courts for claims against the states, proponents of the Eleventh Amendment 
were of course aware that state courts of the era would likely reject creditor claims against 
forum State and tacitly supported that system. But it was the common law thinking of the 
1700s—a view that should not be unthinkingly embraced by modern courts and legislatures, 
much less embraced as a matter of constitutional law. 
125  See generally States Amicus Brief, supra note 63. 
126  See Nevada State Budget and Finances, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_st 
ate_budget_and_finances [https://perma.cc/RQE6-24T8] (last updated June 2017) (citing 
National Association of State Budget Officers, examining fiscal 2013-2015 state spending). 
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course, the Hyatt claim was not one against Nevada but against the much larger 
state of California, with a population of roughly thirty-nine million and an an-
nual budget of roughly $265 billion,127 roughly a thousand times the amount of 
the likely Hyatt award had the case not encountered the issue of limited sover-
eign immunity. 
 In addition, Hyatt is a most unusual case that may lack some of the sympa-
thy provoked by bodily injury tort claims (despite whatever oppression he suf-
fered, Hyatt remained very wealthy and physically unharmed save for physical 
manifestations of his emotional distress). Sympathy for the Tax Board is at 
least equally hard to muster in that the Board, unlike a momentarily inattentive 
truck driver or law enforcement official acting in the heat of the moment, made 
a considered and sustained decision to pursue Mr. Hyatt. The Board can hardly 
be said to have unwittingly wandered into the crosshairs of potential liability. 
 More likely than an unusual privacy-based case like Hyatt (in which the 
plaintiff was willing and able to invest substantial resources on top legal talent), 
threats to the public fisc might include injuries inflicted by state employees 
driving state vehicles, as in Nevada v. Hall. But employing the frequently used 
figure of $6 million as the value of a human life,128 the state would need to be 
held responsible for roughly twenty wrongful deaths each year to reach the 
amount of the exposure presented by the Hyatt litigation. But in 2012, “only” 
131 people nationally were killed in collisions involving emergency vehicles 
such as ambulances (34), fire trucks (14), or police cars (83).129 School bus col-
lisions accounted for only 13 deaths nationally that year.130 
 There were approximately 260 traffic fatalities in the entire state of Nevada 
in 2012.131 Unless the State itself was responsible for more than 10 percent, an 
absurdly remote possibility, Nevada would be able to substantially raise its 
damage limits or even eliminate its immunity without serious fiscal conse-
quences. Of course, governments without immunity would face liability for in-
jury as well as death, and state and local governments would face potential 
                                                        
127  See California State Budget and Finances, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Californ 
ia_state_budget_and_finances [https://perma.cc/7BX4-32GE] (last updated June 2017) (cit-
ing National Association of State Budget Officers). 
128  See Binyamin Appelbaum, As U.S. Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses Fret, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business/economy/17regul 
ation.html [https://perma.cc/W8FM-R7BC]. 
129  See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2012, at 112 
(2012). And 30 of these victims were drivers of the government vehicles, who would pre-
sumably be covered by the exclusive remedy of workers compensation and could not bring a 
tort claim against the government. Further, these figures include emergency vehicles operat-
ed by county and local governments that might not fall within a state law on sovereign im-
munity and might not receive state budgetary funding. Some of the ambulances may have 
been privately operated under contract with local governments. 
130 Id. at 128. 
131 See NEVADA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, OFFICE OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, NEVADA HIGHWAY 
SAFETY: PERFORMANCE PLAN 6 (2017). Other official sources have previously stated death 
numbers of 262 and 258, hence the word “approximately” in text. 
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claims from things other than traffic accidents, particularly if they provide ser-
vices such as schooling and health care. 
 But the mere fact of death or injury does not mandate liability or litigation. 
Many injuries are not the fault of a tortfeasor and this is often so recognized by 
a victim or surviving family member, meaning no claim ever results. Where 
claims do result, governments are proficient in defending claims, reducing the 
amount of relief sought, or perhaps avoiding liability altogether based on an ad-
judicator’s determination of the merits. 
 Before modifying an existing statute on limited liability or immunity, a 
state would of course need to gather and assess more data than this article can 
provide. But even a cursory look at the data suggests that sovereign immunity, 
or limited liability, is not required for the fiscal survival of the states. 
 Ironically, when states have enacted or revised immunity legislation, they 
have tended to do so with little or no empirical analysis. For example, when 
Nevada’s limited liability statute was adopted, its initial selection of a damages 
cap of $25,000 appears to have been based only on the gut feelings of the legis-
lature. The legislative history reflects no extensive study of the fiscal impact of 
claims against the state.132 The same holds true for amendments to the statute 
raising the amount of the damages cap, which now is $ 100,000.133 
 Per capita, Nevada spending and taxation per capita is quite low compared 
to other states.134 Any reasonably likely increase in state tort liability could of 
                                                        
132  See Hearing on Assemb. B. 483 Before the Nev. Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2007 Leg., 
74th Sess. (Nev. 2007) (statement of Barbara Buckley, Assemb., and Thomas Fell, Attorney 
with Gordon and Silver). 
133  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.035(1) (2011). 
134  Calculating an extremely precise per capita figure is difficult due to population growth 
and differences among empirical sources. If using Ballotpedia, one finds per capita spending 
of $3,744.93 after dividing the state budget of $7.143 billion by the 2013 population of 2.8 
million. Historical Nevada Budget and Finance Information, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Historical_Nevada_budget_and_finance_information#tab=As_publish
ed_2016 [https://perma.cc/9P5R-A7EH] (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). If using the State of 
Nevada Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2016, 
one finds total expenditures of $10.943 billion. STATE CONTROLLER, NEVADA 
COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2016 
(2016), http://controller.nv.gov/financialreports/CAFR_pdf_files/FY16All.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/28M6-3CFK] (summarized at STATE CONTROLLER, STATE OF NEVADA: POPULAR 
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT (2016), http://controller.nv.gov/FinancialReports/Other_Reports 
/ReporttoourcitizensFY16.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH8G-ZL2R]). Dividing by a 2016 popula-
tion of 2.9 million persons yields a per expenditure figure of $3,750 per capita. Total state 
tax collections of $5.135 billion divided by the state’s population results in a finding of an 
annual tax burden of $1,760 per capita. 
 The precise figures are not particularly important. What is important is that the per capita tax 
burden in Nevada is not particularly heavy, which strongly suggests that the State does not 
need unrealistically low damages caps to ensure its fiscal survival. To be sure, the massive 
jury award to Hyatt would have presented problems if allowed to stand. But protecting the 
public fisc from the occasional runaway jury does not justify depriving University Medical 
Center patients injured by malpractice or pedestrians hit by a negligently driven state vehicle 
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course increase that tax burden, but the amounts are unlikely to be large. In re-
turn, citizens who were injured by their government would have the right to re-
cover damages provided it was satisfactorily proven that the state wrongfully 
caused the injury to the courts. 
 In addition, of course, states not only have the not insubstantial right to de-
fend claims that are unmeritorious or inflated, but may also purchase liability 
insurance as a means of offloading or spreading the risk of large judgments or a 
sudden surge in the number of claims. Under these circumstances, it is hard to 
imagine that even a small state’s acceptance of market-based responsibility for 
wrongfully inflicted injuries would impose unacceptable financial burdens on 
the state in return for better protection of its citizens or those visiting the state. 
 Liability insurance is not free, but for a government that behaves responsi-
bly and is not hit with an unusual run of bad luck, premiums will be relatively 
modest in return for the protection afforded, typically including a defense of the 
claims from an experienced “panel counsel” retained by the insurer, an entity 
with considerable sophistication in defending and settling claims. To the extent 
the insurance market is “hard” and premiums are unattractively high, govern-
ments are in a position to self-insure, something individuals and small busi-
nesses generally cannot do. 
 In short, the unaffordability argument for removing either limited or com-
plete sovereign immunity is not a compelling one when weighed against the un-
fairness and costs inflicted on victims who are undercompensated. Additional-
ly, to the extent victims of government injury are undercompensated, this does 
not necessarily save the government and its taxpayers money in the long run. 
Uncompensated or undercompensated victims are logically more likely to be 
eligible for government-funded assistance programs. By denying or restricting 
liability for its actions, a government may simply be delaying the spending of 
funds and changing the manner of distribution. 
                                                                                                                                 
of something at least approaching the market rate of compensation they would obtain had 
they been hurt by a doctor in private practice or an ordinary driver. 
A harder fiscal problem is posed by the possible large increase of more modest claims and 
verdicts that might be presented if the damages cap was in the low seven figures rather than 
current $100,000. But this problem can be fixed through the purchase of insurance, effective-
ly making the State’s financial burden the cost of insurance premiums and any self-insured 
retentions or deductibles required by the insurance policy. This is unlikely to be a budget-
breaking amount provided that the State generally acts with due care. The absence of sover-
eign immunity or damage caps does not dictate payment to claimants but only permits pay-
ment if—and this is often a big if—the claimant can survive pretrial defenses, persuade a 
judge or jury at trial, and survive post-trial motions and appeal. As the Hyatt saga itself 
shows, a large claim or verdict is not necessarily the final result. In the absence of a sover-
eign immunity damage cap, Hyatt would have obtained a large award, but not necessarily 
one imperiling Nevada’s finances. A more reasonable, market-based damage cap (e.g., $5 
million rather than $100,000) (furthermore, a cap this high would be relevant only for ex-
tremely serious injuries or very bad government conduct), would have provided substantial 
protection to Nevada and dramatically reduced the Hyatt victory without subjecting automo-
bile collision and malpractice victims to artificially low ceilings on recovery. 
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 The “preserving discretion” ground for restricted government immunity is 
also unpersuasive, at least as applied to actions such as Hyatt and Hall. A gov-
ernment can make a reasonably compelling case for limited liability or even 
immunity concerning true policy decisions. For example, a government logical-
ly should have the discretion to make taxing, spending, zoning, staffing, and 
related planning decisions with a healthy zone of discretion. But even these 
government functions are often subject to at least some judicial oversight.135 
 By contrast, immunity or limited liability makes considerably less sense 
when applied to government action that is more ministerial and does not in-
volve policy choices—or at the other extreme, involve specific targeting of an 
individual citizen as Hyatt alleged had been done to him by California. Liabil-
ity resulting from use of an automobile (as in Nevada v. Hall) is a strong exam-
ple of what the ministerial type of liability resulting from negligent action ra-
ther than harmful policy decisions. If the government is delivering things, or its 
workers are traveling on public highways, there should be responsibility for 
negligently inflicted injuries in the same manner as would exist for non-
government actors. 
 Injuries inflicted by government law enforcement or regulations pose a 
more difficult question. But the answer generally is the same. If a regulatory or 
enforcement agency is simply carrying out its duties, this is not the sort of dis-
cretionary policymaking that justifies immunity or limited liability when gov-
ernment action causes injury. When the California Tax Board decided to pursue 
Hyatt (very aggressively) in connection with issues of residency, the Board 
may not have been acting in a purely ministerial fashion (it could have decided 
to leave Hyatt alone). But neither was it making tax policy. That policy had al-
ready been made through the state establishing rates of state income tax and 
rules regarding residency. The Board was merely seeking to enforce those 
rules—badly, in the estimation of the jury that heard the Hyatt case. 
 I am not suggesting that drawing a line between protected conduct and un-
protected conduct is always or even usually easy. Rather, what I am suggesting 
is that a line needs to be drawn rather than giving government actors carte 
blanche to inflict injury without consequences or with only limited conse-
quences well below what would attend similar conduct in the private sector. 
 For example, prosecutors are generally immune from lawsuits based on 
their exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and often for all of their activities that 
                                                        
135  See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 404–06 (1971) (providing 
judicial review of U.S. Department of Transportation’s decision to route planned Interstate 
40 through Overton Park in Memphis). Contrary to what readers might think upon reading 
that the federal government was planning to run a freeway through a local park, “Overton 
Park is a 342 acre rectangular park set amid an affluent, and predominantly white residential 
area.” See Nicole Mayer et al., Case Comment, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
4 (2009) (on file with Professor Ronald Staudt, Chicago-Kent College of Law). When first 
reading the case in law school, I incorrectly suspected the neighborhood was poor or minori-
ty and hence accounted for the apparent insensitivity in the highway routing. 
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are legitimately related to the prosecution.136 But if a prosecutor acts outside his 
or her role (e.g., by developing a personal vendetta against a suspect or defend-
ant and engaging in harassment or defamation outside the bounds of a criminal 
case), the prosecutor should logically be held accountable. Even where a prose-
cutor is acting solely within the bounds of the legitimate prosecutorial role, he 
or she may be liable for violation of clearly established law.137 
 More pragmatically, one might ask whether the Tax Board and its employ-
ees would be unnecessarily “chilled” in their efforts to enforce the law by the 
prospect of liability (either within its home state or when pursuing a former res-
ident in another state). The likely answer is “no” in view of the standard of 
practice governments have of both defending employees and paying judgments 
on their behalf, with these expenditures often covered by insurance. 
 Government workers feeling a bit chilled or deterred by the prospect of 
some risk of uncovered liability, or the inconvenience and stress of litigation, is 
not necessarily a bad thing. It may prompt the government to hesitate before 
spying on citizens, rifling through their garbage, or investing substantial re-
sources on an enforcement action that is not clear-cut. At a minimum, it would 
incentivize governments to put in place and observe protocols designed to en-
sure that aggressive regulatory enforcement is undertaken only when justified 
and within acceptable boundaries. 
 I am not suggesting that governments are routinely reckless. On the contra-
ry, most are probably, if anything, hesitant to pursue citizens absent compelling 
facts and a reasonable belief in liability. But even if the government track rec-
ord in these matter reaches Sigma Six quality, governments should logically be 
responsible for wrongfully inflicted damages, no matter how unintended or 
well intentioned. In addition to being normatively proper, such a system is un-
likely to place significant financial pressure on governments that act responsi-
bility. 
B. Liability Limitations, the Risk of Race to the Bottom and the Potentially 
Ameliorating Effects of Uniformity 
 A further problem of sovereign immunity or limited liability is that it cre-
ates the collateral public policy problem of inconsistency between state immun-
ity regimes and incentivizes states that might otherwise be willing to relax im-
munity regimes for their own citizens but refrain from doing so for fear of 
being more vulnerable to litigation in other states. To the extent that state poli-
cies toward immunity diverge and to which states unfairly favor themselves 
                                                        
136  See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–20 (1976) (setting forth broad general rule of 
immunity for prosecutors when acting in that capacity). 
137  See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982) (replacing good faith qualified 
immunity standard for government officials facing constitutional or federal statutory claims 
with standard based on whether government actor violated clearly established law, which 
can presumably be done by both conduct within and outside official’s job description). 
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relative to other sovereigns, the goal of fair compensation for victims of gov-
ernment wrongdoing is undermined. 
 One could lay blame for this situation on Nevada v. Hall and argue that the 
solution is its elimination. I prefer to lay the blame upon an unfortunate culture 
of sovereign immunity that lacks a compelling philosophical, fiscal, or public 
policy basis. But in light of Hyatt, it now appears that states will have undue 
incentive to “race to the bottom” in limiting their liability so long as Hall re-
mains good law. Rather than abolish Hall, however, state policymakers and 
courts should be willing to re-examine the historical deference given to sover-
eign immunity. In a modern world, state governments should be willing to take 
responsibility for their actions. 
 At the very least, if state governments insist on limiting liability (presum-
ing compliant courts continue to permit it), damage caps should bear at least a 
rough reflection to a reasonable median or upper range of permissible damages. 
One can easily understand a state’s reluctance to be on the receiving end of a 
$100 million damage award simply because counsel for an irate taxpayer con-
vinced a jury that efforts at tax collection were too aggressive. But this hardly 
makes low damage caps of $50,000, $100,000, or the like defensible. 
 A more reasonable approach (if caps are to remain) is to link the limitation 
to the reasonable approximation of the value of a completely lost or ruined 
life.138 Safety planners conducting cost-benefit analysis have used “ballpark” 
figures such as $6 million for the cost of a human life.139 To be sure, calculating 
and adopting any such uniform figure has analytic problems. 
 And, in cases where state government action does not cause death, the av-
erage-value-of-a-human-life yardstick has clear potential for under-
compensation. For example, the young collision victim of Hall v. Nevada sur-
vived. But providing the special lifetime care required by serious injuries can 
easily result in expenditures well in excess of the value-of-a-life amount chosen 
by analysts. 
 But such problems pale in comparison to a regime that completely immun-
izes even reprehensible state action, or offers only insultingly low compensa-
tion to persons mowed down by a state vehicle, destroyed by malpractice at 
state medical facilities, beaten by state law enforcement, harassed by state 
agencies, or unfairly targeted by overzealous state regulation. The first reaction 
of the mythical average Nevadan (annual household income of roughly $50,000 
                                                        
138  The $6 million figure stems from a Department of Transportation cost-benefit analysis 
and has been used to decide whether to require installation of seat belts on school buses or 
stronger roofs on cars. See Appelbaum, supra note 128. More recently, the Environmental 
Protection Agency has pegged the value of a life at $9.1 million while the Food and Drug 
Administration used a figure of $7.9 million. Id. Rather than dwell on the macabre (but nec-
essary from a public policy standpoint) business of reducing human lives to dollars, this arti-
cle simply takes the position that human lives are worth a lot—but that even if lives are high-
ly valued, states have sufficient economic strength to be held responsible for deaths or 
injuries for which the state is responsible. 
139  Id. 
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per year) or Californian (annual household income of roughly $60,000 per 
year) might well be that a tech multimillionaire’s suffering from a tax investi-
gation is hardly a life or death matter. But both fair compensation and deter-
rence are denied if the tax investigators can abuse with impunity. The thwarting 
of these compensatory and deterrence goals is nearly as great when the state 
can abuse with only the prospect of a maximum liability of $50,000—relative 
pocket change to even a small state. 
 The travails of the plaintiff in Hyatt perhaps should not subject California 
to a half-billion dollars of liability. But some maximum (e.g., $5-$10 million) 
more reasonable than Nevada’s insultingly cosmetic $50,000 would seem apt in 
view of the modern range of judgments for such misconduct against non-
immunized, non-capped defendants. Similarly, one can at least argue that poli-
cy and fiscal reasons justify subjecting someone unfortunate enough to be in-
jured in an auto collision or medical event involving the state to a lower award. 
Those favoring sovereign immunity or damage caps also seem to forget that 
even in the absence of such limitations, courts have considerable power to enter 
judgment as a matter of law against a verdict winner or to order new trials, or 
remittitur if a verdict is regarded as excessive, against the weight of the evi-
dence, or regarded as the product of passion, prejudice, or trial misconduct.140 
V. THE LIKELY FUTURE OF NEVADA V. HALL 
 Hall’s demise was avoided on a 4-4 tie vote, creating yet another reason 
why confirmation of Neal Gorsuch to the Supreme Court will have important 
implications. Although there are not many occasions of a citizen of State A su-
ing State B in the courts of State A for injury inflicted in State A, the principle 
underlying the precedent—that states may not inflict injury outside their bor-
ders without consequence—is an important one well worth preserving. 
 But the principal remains controversial and divides courts and commenta-
tors. The division appears to cleave on traditional liberal-conservative lines in 
that, at least at the Supreme Court level, Justices appointed by Democrats tend 
to support Hall while Justices appointed by Republicans tend to not only dislike 
Hall, but support overturning it. 
 The split can be seen as fitting the overall traits of the respective appoin-
tees. Republicans are more originalist than Democrats and the strongest case 
against Hall is founded on the argument that the Founders would not have 
wanted Hall suing Nevada, or Hyatt suing California. But a broader look at the 
traditional differences between Democratic and Republican appointees suggests 
some inconsistency of the bench toward Hall. 
 Republicans generally harbor more concern about government size, power, 
and abuse while Democrats more frequently support a robust role for govern-
                                                        
140  See NEV. R. CIV. P. 59; NEVADA CIVIL PRACTICE MANUAL § 28 (STATE BAR OF NEV. 
PUBLICATIONS COMM’N 2016) (discussing post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, 
new trial motions and remittitur). 
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ment and want to protect its functions from curtailment. It is thus, to some ex-
tent, surprising that Democratic appointees would support suits against the 
government—particularly if related to an essential government function like tax 
collection (Democrats generally support higher taxes necessary for larger gov-
ernments, while Republicans typically seek smaller government and lower tax-
es). It is similarly surprising that Republican appointees would be unwilling to 
require state governments to answer for their actions in courts of another state 
and to have regulatory agencies, like the California Tax Board, held accounta-
ble. 
 But consistent or not, attitudes toward Hall appear to reflect a relatively 
predictable split between Republican and Democratic appointees. Nonetheless, 
instances such as the Roberts-Thomas dissent in Hyatt IV concerning the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause reflect the complexity and unpredictability surrounding 
the area. 
 Because suits like Hyatt and Hall are not all that common, it may be that 
the Court, as it did from 1970 to 2016, will go decades without deciding a case 
that would serve as an apt vehicle for interring Hall. But Hall’s brush with 
death in Hyatt could be repeated soon if the newest Justice turns out to have 
concerns about Hall. 
CONCLUSION: HYATT AS A CAUTIONARY TALE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 
 As the Hyatt litigation saga continues into its third decade, one grasps for 
some assessment and aspiration toward meaning. The cases and its issues are 
fascinating, particularly (I hope) for readers of the Nevada Law Journal given 
the local ties of the case and the ongoing social, economic and legal relation-
ship between Nevada and neighboring California. 
 One initial question that should be asked is whether the entire episode is an 
example of mistaken judgment upon mistaken judgment? Did the Tax Board 
commit an unforced error in so doggedly pursuing Hyatt? Was Hyatt too reluc-
tant to pursue settlement?141 Was he misallocating resources to fighting back 
that he could have used to fund a compromise? My own view, as someone gen-
erally sympathetic to negotiated dispute resolution, is that it that the long-
running, knock-down, drag-out litigation was a mistake for both sides.142 
                                                        
141 One cannot be sure that settlement was possible in that the Tax Board may have been in-
flexible. But ordinarily, any case can be settled if the antagonists are reasonable regarding 
their “BATNA” or best alternative to a negotiated settlement, and if they bargain over their 
interests (what they need and should want) rather than their positions (who is “right”). See 
generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 97–144 (1981) (introducing the concepts and inaugurating the modern 
negotiation and dispute resolution movement). 
142 In its decision of August 30, 2017, the Franchise Tax Board ruled that the total Hyatt tax 
liability was roughly $2 million plus interest. The State of California obtained this “victory” 
after a quarter century of litigation, millions of dollars of out-of-pocket counsel fees, and 
even more expenditure of the time and effort of salaried state employees (both legal and non-
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 One might similarly wonder, on a jurisprudential basis, whether the case 
(in either its first or second trip to the U.S. Supreme Court) was really worthy 
of Court review? Would the High Court have been better off refusing to hear 
the first 2003 case, in which it merely affirmed the Nevada decision? Perhaps. 
What I have called Hyatt II (the 2003 case) was correctly decided, but so was 
the state decision it reviewed. And in the nearly fifteen subsequent years, Hyatt 
II does not appear to have been widely followed or particularly influential.143 
 However, the 2016 Hyatt IV decision, although it could be styled as a need-
less error correction144 in light of the Court’s deadlock on Nevada v. Hall, did 
                                                                                                                                 
legal) that surely could have been spent on something more productive than birddogging 
Hyatt. Conversely, Mr. Hyatt “won” a substantial reduction in his claimed tax liability as 
well as a judgment against California that will eventually become final and include signifi-
cant costs, counsel fees, and pre-judgment interest. But this victory was obtained at the price 
of years of contentiousness, uncertainty, and distraction, as well as millions of dollars of 
counsel fees and other expenditures that will not be recouped. 
Like any observer, I am affected by hindsight bias as well as not being privy to the non-
public details of the case. Nonetheless, it remains astonishing to me that the fight between 
California and Hyatt went to such lengths and endured so long. See Ashton, supra note 11 
(after Tax Board’s August 30, 2017 vote, Hyatt remains liable for $1.9 million in 1991 state 
taxes, a fraction of the amount sought by the state); Hyatt V, No. 53264, 2017 WL 4079069 
at *2 (Nev. Sept. 14, 2017) (affirming Hyatt’s victory against California on claims of fraud 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress but limiting California’s liability to $50,000 
plus prejudgment interest and reasonable costs and recoverable counsel fees, remanding to 
the trial court for determination). Because of the length of the dispute, the final Hyatt award 
may be considerably larger than $50,000 after addition of interest, costs, and counsel fees—
but it will still be a only a small fraction of the initial jury award and likely only a fraction of 
his total economic burden shouldered in pursuing relief. 
To be sure, Mr. Hyatt also appears to have achieved the emotional satisfaction of being vin-
dicated. It seems clear from his testimony and prolonged litigation that he was genuinely up-
set that the Tax Board was questioning the bona fides of his move to Nevada. And for a per-
son of wealth who can afford the legal fees, perhaps the emotional satisfaction of 
vindication, if it could be monetized, makes it all worthwhile. But in the meantime, the state 
and federal judicial systems, which offer dispute resolution services at a subsidized rate, in-
curred substantial cost due to the Hyatt claims against California, as did the California ad-
ministrative law system because of the decisions and conduct of its own tax agency as well 
as the reaction of the taxpayer. 
143  As of January 2017, the 2003 Hyatt II decision had been cited in fewer than sixty state or 
federal court opinions, an extremely low figure for a U.S. Supreme Court opinion. By con-
trast, Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003), a decision from the same term 
dealing with technicalities retirement benefits for coal miners and essentially unknown to the 
legal profession, has 239 citing decisions during this same 13-year period. Hyatt II has re-
ceived more attention in law reviews, where it has been cited in 147 articles, which outpaces 
the 97 articles citing Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., but both are cited far less than a Su-
preme Court decision regarded as important. For example, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), also from the same term, which addressed constitutional 
limits on punitive damages awards in state court, has been cited roughly 2,100 times in sub-
sequent court decisions and in more than 1,000 law review articles. 
144  California could have suffered the “injustice” of paying more than the Nevada cap. And 
it is unlikely the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision refusing to give California the benefit of 
its own government immunity would have led to a rash of similar decisions or an aggravated 
battle of the states. The size of the Hyatt jury award and the peculiar circumstances of the 
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provide a valuable service to the legal and public policy community. Hyatt IV 
sets forth a potentially valuable principle by putting some teeth into the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause admonition that the laws of other states—and not just 
their judgments—must be respected. 
 The largest unforced error of the Hyatt imbroglio is perhaps the one receiv-
ing least discussion: the problematic persistence of state government immunity 
and limited liability. What one critical court described fifty years ago as a de-
vice “invented to solve the marital problems of Henry VIII”145 that had outlived 
its usefulness looks even more decrepit today. Artificially protecting govern-
ment actors from the consequences faced by the rest of society fails on norma-
tive terms and cannot be rehabilitated by fiscal arguments or concerns about 
unduly chilling discretion. In a modern world of extensive government action 
constantly touching the lives of the citizenry, state governments should be re-
quired to at least account for their actions, and be subject to judgment when 
they violate the law. At the very least, the States should adopt respectably ade-
quate caps on recovery in place of insultingly low limits like Nevada’s, and 
should adopt a consistent approach that reduces forum shopping and interstate 
tension. 
 Although perhaps excessive (and certainly a little kitschy), the wave of 
quotations at the beginning of this article were selected with purpose. All could 
apply to the most unusual Hyatt case and the larger issues of sovereign im-
munity, full faith and credit, and interstate relations. Per the Mark Twain quote, 
an overwhelming majority of state Attorneys General reflexively favored sov-
ereign immunity and overturning Hall.146 They should be a bit more reflective 
about this area of law. 
 Per the George Bernard Shaw quote, states should be more interested in 
fair treatment of individual citizens and less concerned about aggregate costs 
                                                                                                                                 
case were attention-grabbing, but leaving the Hyatt III Nevada Supreme Court decision of 
2014 alone might well have been the better part of valor. 
145  See Evans v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of El Paso Cty., 482 P.2d 968, 969 (Colo. 1971) (“The 
monarchical philosophies invented to solve the marital problems of Henry VIII are not suffi-
cient justification for the denial of the right of recovery against the government in today’s 
society. Assuming that there was sovereign immunity of the Kings of England, our forebears 
won the Revolutionary War to rid themselves of such sovereign prerogatives.”); see also 
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457, 460 (Cal. 1961) (“The rule of governmental 
immunity for tort is an anachronism, without rational basis, and has existed only by the force 
of inertia.”); Steven A. Sindell, Sovereign Immunity—An Argument Con, 22 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 55, 55 (1973) (collecting criticisms of sovereign immunity and noting split in the states 
on the issue). 
146  The States also rallied round California in Hyatt V, which included amicus briefs from 
Arkansa, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New 
Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washing-
ton as well as the Multistate Tax Commission. See Hyatt V, 2017 WL 4079069, at *1–2. Not 
all of the state wrath was directed at constitutional questions. California also, with at least 
the tacit support of the states, successfully argued that the trial court had made evidentiary 
errors, but the Hyatt V Court found these insufficient to overturn Hyatt’s victory at trial. See 
id. at 1135–40. 
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and political expedience. Caps seem like a good idea when enacted by people 
who have not been injured by the state. It is easy for an as yet unscathed Legis-
lator to limit recovery for state wrongs. Yet, Legislators might feel differently if 
they had been hit by a state vehicle, suffered malpractice at a state facility, or 
been hounded by a state administrative agency. 
 Per the Elihu Root quote, one wonders whether the Hyatt antagonists really 
needed to fight for a quarter-century with two trips to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Per the quote attributed to Albert Einstein, state governments should realize the 
drawbacks of continuing to cling to a regime of an inconsistent quilt of sover-
eign immunity that hurts victims of government harm with little or no corre-
sponding benefit to the public at large. 
 But the one perhaps most apt quotation is that of psychiatrist Carl Jung, 
which implicitly argues for a bit more empathy and cost-benefit analysis, and a 
little less historical formalism regarding government liability and interstate re-
lations.147 Nevada’s willingness to entertain the Hyatt suit of course irritated 
California, just as Plaintiff Hall’s suit irritated Nevada some thirty-five years 
earlier. But if states divorced themselves from short-term and self-serving fiscal 
and administrative considerations and thought a little more about how their in-
jured citizens or moving taxpayers—or persons anywhere—should be treated 
by the legal system, they might make progress. At least enough progress to 
avoid or reduce such suits and the situations giving rise to these claims. Real 
reform and better quality control of government action would be a better ex-
penditure of resources than attacking Nevada v. Hall and hoping for a return to 
the glory days of sovereign immunity. The persistence of states in clinging not 
only to sovereign immunity, but also to unduly low limits of recovery when 
that immunity is waived (often only in limited part), has both impoverished 
policymaking and proven a prescription for constitutional imbroglio. 
                                                        
147  See supra p. 1. 
